tic: run per-user under a system-agent scheduler, with a run log
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Reframe TIC from an ownerless global loop into a per-user system agent.
The events it reads live in each user's own encrypted mcp_events, the
connectors that produced them run in that user's container, and the
notifications go to that user's hub — so the previous design (built
against the ownerless Conversation bundle, writing into system.db and
notifying a hub with no subscribers) was inert by construction.

Core changes
- TicManager owns no timer and no user list. It now exposes
  run_for(user_id, pool, sessions, hub): one tick for one user, over
  deps unpacked from that user's UserContext. Removed from the
  Conversation bundle; Skald::tic_manager() is gone.
- New spawn_system_agents in wiring.rs: one instance-wide loop, spawned
  post-construction with a Weak<Skald> (like spawn_user_lifecycle).
  Each pass walks the directory and runs TIC for one user at a time —
  sequential, because a pass is N container round-trips and N LLM calls
  nobody is waiting on. A ConfigKeyUpdated on the interval key cuts the
  current wait short; enabled is re-read per pass.
- A user whose database is still locked is skipped (normal, not an
  error): the pool is the unlock token, so a user who hasn't logged in
  since restart has no readable events and nowhere to record a skip.
- The configured tic.security_group is re-checked per user through
  run_context::reconcile_group_for_user — a restricted member never
  gets a tool set their role wouldn't grant; unconfigured starts from
  role_default_run_context, never None (None = catch-all = wider).
- New system_agent_runs owner table (no user_id column — the file is
  the owner): start/finish split so a crash leaves a visible 'running'
  row, swept to 'failed' by the next start; safe because the scheduler
  is sequential and single-instance. An idle tick writes nothing.
- counting_notify wraps the notify tool so the run log can report
  notifications emitted without the tool knowing it's counted.
- The session's event channel is drained by a spawned task instead of
  a dropped receiver — the translator awaits its sends and would wedge
  at capacity.

EventLog::{Persist,Discard} on McpManager::new
- mcp_events is an owner table and its only reader (TIC) is per-user,
  so an event is something that happened to someone. The per-user
  runtime gets Persist; the ownerless global runtime gets Discard (its
  pool is system.db, rows would be unattributable and unread).

API + UI
- GET /api/system-agents/runs: the caller's own run history, scoped
  through require_context with no admin override (same promise as the
  rest of the private pool).
- web/components/system-agents.js replaces tic-sessions.js. The old
  #tic debug page inferred runs from leftover ephemeral sessions; the
  new #system-agents page (sidebar group 'extensions', visible to
  everyone — the data is the caller's own) reads the real run log.
- i18n: tic.* keys replaced with system_agents.* in en/it/fr.

Docs
- New docs/system-agents.md (user-facing: what TIC does, why it runs
  per person, why a run can be missing). Updated docs/settings.md and
  docs/index.md.
- agents/tic/AGENT.md reframed per-user: events are that person's,
  memory is user-memory/ (private) — never shared-memory/.
- CLAUDE.md records the system-agents design and the EventLog seam.
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-27 11:39:13 +01:00
parent 305bdbdd2b
commit 165af19774
26 changed files with 1151 additions and 499 deletions
+41
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ pub mod scheduled_jobs;
pub mod scratchpad;
pub mod shared_folders;
pub mod sources;
pub mod system_agent_runs;
pub mod tool_permission_groups;
pub mod users;
@@ -895,6 +896,45 @@ pub async fn create_owner_tables(pool: &SqlitePool) -> Result<()> {
.execute(pool)
.await?;
// Execution log of the **system agents** — the background agents the instance
// runs on a user's behalf without being asked (TIC is the first and, today,
// the only one). The sibling of `job_runs`: same shape, but keyed on the agent
// instead of a scheduled job, because a system agent has no user-authored row
// to point at.
//
// Owner table, and that is the whole privacy story: a run of TIC summarises
// what landed in this user's inbox, so it belongs in *their* encrypted file
// and nowhere else. There is deliberately no `user_id` column — the file is
// the owner (§5.1). An admin reading `system.db` learns nothing about it.
//
// A user whose database is still locked is skipped by the scheduler and
// produces no row at all: the only file that could hold it is the one we
// cannot open. Hence no 'skipped' status — the skip is a log line (§9).
sqlx::query(
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS system_agent_runs (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
agent_id TEXT NOT NULL,
session_id INTEGER,
started_at TEXT NOT NULL,
completed_at TEXT,
duration_ms INTEGER,
status TEXT NOT NULL
CHECK(status IN ('running', 'completed', 'failed', 'cancelled')),
stats TEXT,
error TEXT,
created_at TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT (datetime('now'))
)",
)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_system_agent_runs_agent
ON system_agent_runs (agent_id, created_at DESC)",
)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS mcp_events (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
@@ -1098,6 +1138,7 @@ mod tests {
one("INSERT INTO scheduled_jobs (id, title, cron, prompt, session_id) VALUES (1, 't', '* * * * *', 'p', 1)")
.await.unwrap();
one("INSERT INTO job_runs (job_id, started_at, status) VALUES (1, 'now', 'completed')").await.unwrap();
one("INSERT INTO system_agent_runs (agent_id, started_at, status) VALUES ('tic', 'now', 'running')").await.unwrap();
// Owner table with a BARE `catalog_name` ref — proves it stands alone with
// FKs on (an owner→registry FK here would die on this INSERT).
one("INSERT INTO mcp_user_servers (name, catalog_name, source) VALUES ('u', 'whatsapp', 'local_script')").await.unwrap();