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2026-07-10 15:02:09 +01:00

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28 KiB
Rust

//! Cryptography shared between the relay, the mobile-connector plugin, and the
//! reference vector generator (see plugin.md §1.1, crypto.md).
//!
//! Two layers live here:
//!
//! 1. **Relay subset** — the relay only ever verifies the Ed25519
//! challenge-response signature (crypto.md §8) and derives the `namespace_id`
//! (crypto.md §7). It never touches X25519/AEAD.
//! 2. **End-to-end suite** — key derivation from a seed, X25519 ECDH, the
//! HKDF → `aes_key` step, AES-256-GCM seal/open, and nonce construction
//! (crypto.md §3-6). These are used by the plugin (and by `gen-vectors`) so
//! that every Rust consumer produces byte-identical output to the reference
//! vectors in test-vectors.md.
use aes_gcm::aead::{Aead, Payload};
use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, KeyInit, Nonce};
use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
use flate2::Compression;
use flate2::read::ZlibDecoder;
use flate2::write::ZlibEncoder;
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Domain constants (crypto.md §1). These MUST stay byte-identical across all
// implementations — changing one invalidates the protocol and the vectors.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Challenge-response signing domain (crypto.md §1, `AUTH_DOMAIN`).
pub const AUTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"skald-relay-auth-v1";
/// Namespace derivation domain (crypto.md §1, `NS_DOMAIN`).
pub const NS_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"skald-namespace-v1";
/// Key-derivation salt for deriving Ed25519/X25519 private keys from the seed
/// (crypto.md §3). Used with info `"ed25519"` / `"x25519"`.
pub const KDF_SALT: &[u8] = b"skald-kdf-v1";
/// HKDF info string for the X25519 private key derivation (crypto.md §3).
pub const KDF_INFO_X25519: &[u8] = b"x25519";
/// HKDF info string for the Ed25519 private key derivation (crypto.md §3).
pub const KDF_INFO_ED25519: &[u8] = b"ed25519";
/// HKDF salt for deriving the per-session AES key from the ECDH shared secret
/// (crypto.md §5).
pub const SESSION_SALT: &[u8] = b"skald-session-v1";
/// HKDF info string for the AES-256-GCM session key (crypto.md §5).
pub const SESSION_INFO_AES: &[u8] = b"aes-256-gcm";
/// Nonce direction prefix, agent → client (crypto.md §6).
pub const DIR_AGENT_TO_CLIENT: [u8; 4] = [0, 0, 0, 1];
/// Nonce direction prefix, client → agent (crypto.md §6).
pub const DIR_CLIENT_TO_AGENT: [u8; 4] = [0, 0, 0, 2];
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Encoding helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Decode a hex pubkey/signature/id (case-insensitive on input) into `N` bytes.
/// Returns `None` on malformed hex or wrong length.
pub fn decode_hex<const N: usize>(s: &str) -> Option<[u8; N]> {
let bytes = hex::decode(s).ok()?;
if bytes.len() != N {
return None;
}
let mut out = [0u8; N];
out.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
Some(out)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Relay subset: namespace derivation + challenge verification
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// `namespace_id = hex(SHA256(NS_DOMAIN ‖ 0x00 ‖ agent_ed25519_pub))` (crypto.md §7).
/// Returns both the raw 32 bytes and the lowercase hex string.
pub fn namespace_id(agent_ed25519_pub: &[u8; 32]) -> ([u8; 32], String) {
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(NS_DOMAIN);
h.update([0u8]);
h.update(agent_ed25519_pub);
let raw: [u8; 32] = h.finalize().into();
let hexed = hex::encode(raw);
(raw, hexed)
}
/// Build the challenge message that is signed/verified:
/// `AUTH_DOMAIN ‖ 0x00 ‖ challenge_nonce_raw(32B)` (crypto.md §8).
pub fn challenge_message(challenge_nonce_raw: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut msg = Vec::with_capacity(AUTH_DOMAIN.len() + 1 + 32);
msg.extend_from_slice(AUTH_DOMAIN);
msg.push(0x00);
msg.extend_from_slice(challenge_nonce_raw);
msg
}
/// Verify the Ed25519 challenge signature over the [`challenge_message`] under
/// `ed25519_pub`. Uses `verify_strict` (rejects malleable signatures / low-order
/// keys).
pub fn verify_challenge(
ed25519_pub: &[u8; 32],
challenge_nonce_raw: &[u8; 32],
signature: &[u8; 64],
) -> bool {
let Ok(vk) = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(ed25519_pub) else {
return false;
};
let sig = Signature::from_bytes(signature);
vk.verify_strict(&challenge_message(challenge_nonce_raw), &sig)
.is_ok()
}
/// Sign the challenge message with `signing_key` (used by the agent/plugin and
/// by the reference generator). Returns the 64-byte signature.
pub fn sign_challenge(signing_key: &SigningKey, challenge_nonce_raw: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 64] {
signing_key
.sign(&challenge_message(challenge_nonce_raw))
.to_bytes()
}
/// Plain SHA-256 of `data` (used e.g. for the pipe data-plane `dest =
/// SHA256(peer_ed25519_pub)` cross-check, pipe.md §2.1).
pub fn sha256(data: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(data);
h.finalize().into()
}
/// Constant-time comparison of two tokens/secrets (relay.md §6: pairing_token).
pub fn ct_eq(a: &[u8], b: &[u8]) -> bool {
if a.len() != b.len() {
return false;
}
a.ct_eq(b).into()
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// End-to-end suite: key derivation, ECDH, AEAD (crypto.md §3-6)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// HKDF-SHA256 expanding to a 32-byte output (crypto.md §3/§5).
pub fn hkdf32(ikm: &[u8], salt: &[u8], info: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(Some(salt), ikm);
let mut out = [0u8; 32];
hk.expand(info, &mut out)
.expect("32 is a valid HKDF-SHA256 output length");
out
}
/// The Ed25519 + X25519 key material derived from a 32-byte seed (crypto.md §3).
pub struct DerivedKeys {
pub ed25519_priv: [u8; 32],
pub ed25519_pub: [u8; 32],
pub x25519_priv: [u8; 32],
pub x25519_pub: [u8; 32],
}
impl DerivedKeys {
/// Reconstruct the Ed25519 signing key from the derived private bytes.
pub fn signing_key(&self) -> SigningKey {
SigningKey::from_bytes(&self.ed25519_priv)
}
/// Reconstruct the X25519 static secret from the derived private bytes.
pub fn x25519_secret(&self) -> StaticSecret {
StaticSecret::from(self.x25519_priv)
}
}
/// Derive the Ed25519 and X25519 key pairs from a 32-byte seed (crypto.md §3):
/// each private key is `HKDF(seed, salt="skald-kdf-v1", info=<algo>, 32)`.
pub fn derive_keys(seed: &[u8; 32]) -> DerivedKeys {
let ed25519_priv = hkdf32(seed, KDF_SALT, KDF_INFO_ED25519);
let x25519_priv = hkdf32(seed, KDF_SALT, KDF_INFO_X25519);
let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&ed25519_priv);
let ed25519_pub = signing.verifying_key().to_bytes();
let x_secret = StaticSecret::from(x25519_priv);
let x25519_pub = PublicKey::from(&x_secret).to_bytes();
DerivedKeys {
ed25519_priv,
ed25519_pub,
x25519_priv,
x25519_pub,
}
}
/// X25519 public key from a raw 32-byte private scalar (clamping applied
/// internally, consistent with [`ecdh`]). Used to derive a pipe ephemeral pubkey
/// from a freshly-sampled private key (pipe.md §3).
pub fn x25519_pubkey(x25519_priv: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
PublicKey::from(&StaticSecret::from(*x25519_priv)).to_bytes()
}
/// X25519 ECDH: compute the shared secret between `my_x25519_priv` and the
/// peer's public key (crypto.md §4).
pub fn ecdh(my_x25519_priv: &[u8; 32], peer_x25519_pub: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
let secret = StaticSecret::from(*my_x25519_priv);
let peer = PublicKey::from(*peer_x25519_pub);
*secret.diffie_hellman(&peer).as_bytes()
}
/// Derive the per-session AES-256-GCM key from the ECDH shared secret
/// (crypto.md §5).
pub fn derive_aes_key(shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
hkdf32(shared_secret, SESSION_SALT, SESSION_INFO_AES)
}
/// Build the 12-byte AEAD nonce: `direction(4B) ‖ counter(8B big-endian)`
/// (crypto.md §6).
pub fn build_nonce(direction: [u8; 4], counter: u64) -> [u8; 12] {
let mut n = [0u8; 12];
n[..4].copy_from_slice(&direction);
n[4..].copy_from_slice(&counter.to_be_bytes());
n
}
/// Build the AEAD additional-authenticated-data: `namespace_id_raw ‖ from_pub ‖
/// to_pub`, all 32-byte raw values (crypto.md §6).
pub fn build_aad(namespace_id_raw: &[u8; 32], from_pub: &[u8; 32], to_pub: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut aad = Vec::with_capacity(96);
aad.extend_from_slice(namespace_id_raw);
aad.extend_from_slice(from_pub);
aad.extend_from_slice(to_pub);
aad
}
/// AES-256-GCM seal: returns `ciphertext ‖ tag` (crypto.md §6). `Err` only on a
/// malformed key length (the AEAD itself never fails on encrypt).
pub fn seal(
aes_key: &[u8; 32],
nonce: &[u8; 12],
aad: &[u8],
plaintext: &[u8],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(aes_key).map_err(|_| CryptoError::Key)?;
cipher
.encrypt(Nonce::from_slice(nonce), Payload { msg: plaintext, aad })
.map_err(|_| CryptoError::Aead)
}
/// AES-256-GCM open: verifies the tag and returns the plaintext (crypto.md §6).
/// `Err(CryptoError::Aead)` on tag mismatch / wrong key / wrong AAD.
pub fn open(
aes_key: &[u8; 32],
nonce: &[u8; 12],
aad: &[u8],
ciphertext: &[u8],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, CryptoError> {
let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new_from_slice(aes_key).map_err(|_| CryptoError::Key)?;
cipher
.decrypt(Nonce::from_slice(nonce), Payload { msg: ciphertext, aad })
.map_err(|_| CryptoError::Aead)
}
/// Errors from the AEAD layer. Intentionally opaque: never leak plaintext or
/// distinguish failure causes to a caller that might log them.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum CryptoError {
/// Invalid key length supplied to the cipher.
Key,
/// Seal/open failed (e.g. authentication tag mismatch on open).
Aead,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for CryptoError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
CryptoError::Key => write!(f, "invalid AES key length"),
CryptoError::Aead => write!(f, "AES-GCM operation failed"),
}
}
}
impl std::error::Error for CryptoError {}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// v2 plaintext framing (data/iOS-app/v2/framing.md §1, §2, §3)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Framing version byte for `compress_payload` / `decompress_payload`
/// (framing.md §1). Always `0x01` today.
pub const FRAMING_VERSION: u8 = 0x01;
/// `comp` byte value: no compression (framing.md §2).
pub const COMP_NONE: u8 = 0x00;
/// `comp` byte value: zlib / DEFLATE (framing.md §2).
pub const COMP_ZLIB: u8 = 0x01;
/// Soglia: solo comprimere se `len(payload) > COMPRESS_THRESHOLD` (framing.md §2.3).
pub const COMPRESS_THRESHOLD: usize = 1024;
/// Hard ceiling on the decompressed payload size (defense-in-depth against a
/// zlib bomb from a compromised authorized device). A small ciphertext, under
/// the frame limit, could otherwise expand to many GB. 8 MiB is well above any
/// legitimate payload (the largest, `health_sync` on the live channel, is
/// bounded by `MAX_LIVE_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES` ≈ 512 KiB even before compression).
pub const MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Compose the v2 plaintext frame around `payload`:
/// `version(0x01) ‖ comp(1B) ‖ payload`. Compresses with zlib if
/// `payload.len() > COMPRESS_THRESHOLD` (framing.md §2.3, §1).
pub fn compress_payload(payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
if payload.len() > COMPRESS_THRESHOLD {
let mut enc = ZlibEncoder::new(Vec::new(), Compression::default());
enc.write_all(payload).expect("zlib write to Vec is infallible");
let compressed = enc.finish().expect("zlib finish is infallible");
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + compressed.len());
out.push(FRAMING_VERSION);
out.push(COMP_ZLIB);
out.extend_from_slice(&compressed);
out
} else {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + payload.len());
out.push(FRAMING_VERSION);
out.push(COMP_NONE);
out.extend_from_slice(payload);
out
}
}
/// Errors from the v2 plaintext framing (framing.md §3). The error variant
/// is intentionally opaque to avoid leaking information to upstream callers.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum FramingError {
/// Truncated input (fewer than 2 bytes).
Short,
/// `version` byte is not `0x01`.
BadVersion,
/// `comp` byte is not in `{0x00, 0x01}`.
BadComp,
/// zlib decompress failed (corrupt compressed body) or the decompressed
/// output exceeded [`MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES`].
Zlib,
}
impl std::fmt::Display for FramingError {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
FramingError::Short => write!(f, "framing input shorter than 2 bytes"),
FramingError::BadVersion => write!(f, "unknown framing version"),
FramingError::BadComp => write!(f, "unknown compression algorithm"),
FramingError::Zlib => write!(f, "zlib decompress failed"),
}
}
}
impl std::error::Error for FramingError {}
/// Decompose a v2 plaintext frame: return the original `payload` (i.e. the
/// bytes that were passed to `compress_payload`). Validates the framing
/// header and decompresses the body if `comp == 0x01` (framing.md §3).
pub fn decompress_payload(plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, FramingError> {
let (version, comp, body) = match plaintext.split_first_chunk::<2>() {
Some((&[v, c], rest)) => (v, c, rest),
None => return Err(FramingError::Short),
};
if version != FRAMING_VERSION {
return Err(FramingError::BadVersion);
}
match comp {
COMP_NONE => Ok(body.to_vec()),
COMP_ZLIB => {
// Cap the output: `take` makes the reader yield EOF at the limit, so
// a zlib bomb stops there instead of exhausting memory. If the
// decoder still has bytes left we hit exactly the limit and reject.
let mut dec = ZlibDecoder::new(body).take(MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES + 1);
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity((body.len() * 2).min(MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES as usize));
dec.read_to_end(&mut out).map_err(|_| FramingError::Zlib)?;
if out.len() as u64 > MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES {
return Err(FramingError::Zlib);
}
Ok(out)
}
_ => Err(FramingError::BadComp),
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Pipe protocol crypto (docs/relay/pipe.md §3, §5). The data-plane auth reuses
// the Ed25519 challenge primitive with its own domain; the secure channel
// reuses ECDH + HKDF + AES-256-GCM, keyed by a *per-pipe ephemeral* DH (PFS).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/// Data-plane auth signing domain (pipe.md §2.1, `PIPE_AUTH_DOMAIN`).
pub const PIPE_AUTH_DOMAIN: &[u8] = b"skald-pipe-auth-v1";
/// HKDF salt for deriving the per-pipe AES key from the ephemeral ECDH secret.
pub const PIPE_KDF_SALT: &[u8] = b"skald-pipe-v1";
/// HKDF info for the per-pipe AES-256-GCM key.
pub const PIPE_KDF_INFO: &[u8] = b"pipe-aes-256-gcm";
/// Nonce direction prefix, pipe initiator → responder (pipe.md §3).
pub const DIR_PIPE_INITIATOR: [u8; 4] = [0, 0, 0, 3];
/// Nonce direction prefix, pipe responder → initiator (pipe.md §3).
pub const DIR_PIPE_RESPONDER: [u8; 4] = [0, 0, 0, 4];
/// Framing version byte marking a **pipe signaling** payload on the E2E channel:
/// `0x02 ‖ comp(0x00) ‖ msgpack`. Distinct from [`FRAMING_VERSION`] (`0x01`,
/// JSON app payloads) so the receiver can route by peeking the first byte
/// *without* changing [`decompress_payload`] (which still rejects `0x02`).
pub const FRAMING_VERSION_PIPE: u8 = 0x02;
/// Derive the per-pipe AES-256-GCM key from the ephemeral ECDH shared secret.
pub fn derive_pipe_key(eph_shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] {
hkdf32(eph_shared_secret, PIPE_KDF_SALT, PIPE_KDF_INFO)
}
/// Build the data-plane auth message that is signed/verified (pipe.md §2.1):
/// `PIPE_AUTH_DOMAIN ‖ 0x00 ‖ challenge_nonce(32B) ‖ connection_id(32B)`.
pub fn pipe_auth_message(challenge_nonce: &[u8; 32], connection_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut msg = Vec::with_capacity(PIPE_AUTH_DOMAIN.len() + 1 + 32 + 32);
msg.extend_from_slice(PIPE_AUTH_DOMAIN);
msg.push(0x00);
msg.extend_from_slice(challenge_nonce);
msg.extend_from_slice(connection_id);
msg
}
/// Sign the data-plane auth message with `signing_key`. Returns the 64B signature.
pub fn sign_pipe_auth(
signing_key: &SigningKey,
challenge_nonce: &[u8; 32],
connection_id: &[u8; 32],
) -> [u8; 64] {
signing_key
.sign(&pipe_auth_message(challenge_nonce, connection_id))
.to_bytes()
}
/// Verify the data-plane auth signature under `ed25519_pub` (uses `verify_strict`).
pub fn verify_pipe_auth(
ed25519_pub: &[u8; 32],
challenge_nonce: &[u8; 32],
connection_id: &[u8; 32],
signature: &[u8; 64],
) -> bool {
let Ok(vk) = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(ed25519_pub) else {
return false;
};
let sig = Signature::from_bytes(signature);
vk.verify_strict(&pipe_auth_message(challenge_nonce, connection_id), &sig)
.is_ok()
}
/// Wrap a MsgPack pipe-signaling payload in the reserved framing:
/// `FRAMING_VERSION_PIPE ‖ COMP_NONE ‖ msgpack` (uncompressed; signaling is tiny).
pub fn frame_pipe_signal(msgpack: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(2 + msgpack.len());
out.push(FRAMING_VERSION_PIPE);
out.push(COMP_NONE);
out.extend_from_slice(msgpack);
out
}
/// `true` if a decrypted E2E plaintext is a pipe-signaling frame (vs a `0x01`
/// app payload). A cheap first-byte peek used to route inbound messages.
pub fn is_pipe_signal(framed: &[u8]) -> bool {
framed.first() == Some(&FRAMING_VERSION_PIPE)
}
/// Strip the pipe-signaling framing, returning the inner MsgPack body. `None`
/// if the header is not exactly `FRAMING_VERSION_PIPE ‖ COMP_NONE`.
pub fn unframe_pipe_signal(framed: &[u8]) -> Option<&[u8]> {
match framed.split_first_chunk::<2>() {
Some((&[FRAMING_VERSION_PIPE, COMP_NONE], body)) => Some(body),
_ => None,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
#[test]
fn decode_hex_rejects_wrong_len() {
assert!(decode_hex::<32>("00").is_none());
assert!(decode_hex::<32>("zz".repeat(32).as_str()).is_none());
assert_eq!(decode_hex::<2>("ABcd"), Some([0xAB, 0xCD])); // accepts uppercase
}
#[test]
fn challenge_roundtrip() {
let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7u8; 32]);
let pk = sk.verifying_key().to_bytes();
let nonce = [0x42u8; 32];
let sig = sign_challenge(&sk, &nonce);
assert!(verify_challenge(&pk, &nonce, &sig));
// Different nonce → invalid signature.
assert!(!verify_challenge(&pk, &[0x43u8; 32], &sig));
// Different key → invalid.
let other = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[8u8; 32])
.verifying_key()
.to_bytes();
assert!(!verify_challenge(&other, &nonce, &sig));
}
#[test]
fn namespace_id_is_hex_of_sha256() {
let pk = [0u8; 32];
let (raw, hexed) = namespace_id(&pk);
assert_eq!(hexed.len(), 64);
assert_eq!(hex::encode(raw), hexed);
}
#[test]
fn ecdh_is_symmetric_and_seals_roundtrip() {
let seed_a: [u8; 32] = (0u8..32).collect::<Vec<_>>().try_into().unwrap();
let seed_c: [u8; 32] = (32u8..64).collect::<Vec<_>>().try_into().unwrap();
let a = derive_keys(&seed_a);
let c = derive_keys(&seed_c);
let s1 = ecdh(&a.x25519_priv, &c.x25519_pub);
let s2 = ecdh(&c.x25519_priv, &a.x25519_pub);
assert_eq!(s1, s2, "ECDH must be symmetric");
let key = derive_aes_key(&s1);
let (ns_raw, _) = namespace_id(&a.ed25519_pub);
let nonce = build_nonce(DIR_AGENT_TO_CLIENT, 1);
let aad = build_aad(&ns_raw, &a.ed25519_pub, &c.ed25519_pub);
let pt = b"hello world";
let sealed = seal(&key, &nonce, &aad, pt).unwrap();
let opened = open(&key, &nonce, &aad, &sealed).unwrap();
assert_eq!(opened, pt);
// Tampered AAD must fail to open.
let mut bad_aad = aad.clone();
bad_aad[0] ^= 1;
assert!(open(&key, &nonce, &bad_aad, &sealed).is_err());
}
/// Cross-compat: the iOS client uses `CryptoKit` to sign the auth challenge,
/// the relay uses `ed25519-dalek` to verify. The two libraries produce
/// *different* (but both valid) Ed25519 signatures for the same (key,
/// message) — see `data/ios-app/test-vectors.md` §4 "Note on V18". This test
/// pins the two signatures the relay must accept for the canonical
/// `SEED_CLIENT = bytes(32..<64)` test vector.
#[test]
fn challenge_verifies_cryptokit_signature() {
// V8 client_ed25519_pub from test-vectors.md §4.
let client_pub: [u8; 32] =
hex::decode("12355ea750e60d6370ba6776037f25062f6c9450c5009669884895fd5b377a18")
.unwrap()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
let challenge: [u8; 32] =
hex::decode("aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899")
.unwrap()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
// V18 from test-vectors.md §4 (CryptoKit signature).
let v18_cryptokit: [u8; 64] =
hex::decode("a2af4518a7001e3269006d30e1175d33d36cc23350c6c4def8347be8ec97e32ce51c4f066ca29cc497690aa241524d20ea20a72d38d9beb6da01e966aada8508")
.unwrap()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
// The dalek reference value (regression — see "Note on V18" in §4).
let v18_dalek: [u8; 64] =
hex::decode("ae38491a1f25bb5fb11f0b17e3d344412bfc927461b6517e9a0ab6a64020054677f59490af026f34c81d9378d4daae4823109ca2d1afbf4ff00230a038270002")
.unwrap()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
assert!(verify_challenge(&client_pub, &challenge, &v18_cryptokit),
"relay must accept the CryptoKit signature committed as V18");
assert!(verify_challenge(&client_pub, &challenge, &v18_dalek),
"relay must also accept the historical dalek reference signature");
// Sanity: tampered signature is rejected.
let mut bad = v18_cryptokit;
bad[0] ^= 0x01;
assert!(!verify_challenge(&client_pub, &challenge, &bad));
}
/// Pin the derived keys / namespace / aes_key against the committed vectors
/// (test-vectors.md §4) so the library functions can never silently diverge.
#[test]
fn library_matches_reference_vectors() {
let seed_a: [u8; 32] = (0u8..32).collect::<Vec<_>>().try_into().unwrap();
let a = derive_keys(&seed_a);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(a.ed25519_pub),
"b3e202f4ac99fd9929da47df20adedd5b2598411a466a229f086eda3467ffa7b"
);
let (ns_raw, ns_hex) = namespace_id(&a.ed25519_pub);
assert_eq!(
ns_hex,
"f7d340d3c3f0b0052fa904ba60ebd38a0f7e7d10672ac80648991a2c632c9e58"
);
let seed_c: [u8; 32] = (32u8..64).collect::<Vec<_>>().try_into().unwrap();
let c = derive_keys(&seed_c);
let shared = ecdh(&a.x25519_priv, &c.x25519_pub);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(shared),
"66c51034dd6360b9cdddc495049463b0191d7f3bddce9ea6f2975c85d471540a"
);
let aes_key = derive_aes_key(&shared);
assert_eq!(
hex::encode(aes_key),
"74fb4ffcbbe069859cfb0790023811554dad328d9f4ac4a1d28077086e33a4e7"
);
let _ = ns_raw;
}
#[test]
fn framing_round_trip_small_payload_no_compression() {
// Below threshold → comp = 0x00
let payload = b"{\"v\":1,\"kind\":\"x\"}";
let framed = compress_payload(payload);
assert_eq!(framed[0], FRAMING_VERSION);
assert_eq!(framed[1], COMP_NONE);
assert_eq!(&framed[2..], payload);
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&framed).unwrap(), payload);
}
#[test]
fn framing_round_trip_large_payload_zlib() {
// Build a payload that clearly crosses the threshold and is
// highly compressible (a repeated string → ~1% of original).
let payload: Vec<u8> = "skald ".repeat(500).into_bytes();
assert!(payload.len() > COMPRESS_THRESHOLD);
let framed = compress_payload(&payload);
assert_eq!(framed[0], FRAMING_VERSION);
assert_eq!(framed[1], COMP_ZLIB);
// Compressed body must be smaller than the original.
assert!(framed.len() < payload.len());
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&framed).unwrap(), payload);
}
#[test]
fn framing_rejects_bad_version() {
let mut bad = vec![0x02, COMP_NONE];
bad.extend_from_slice(b"x");
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&bad), Err(FramingError::BadVersion));
}
#[test]
fn framing_rejects_bad_comp() {
let mut bad = vec![FRAMING_VERSION, 0x02];
bad.extend_from_slice(b"x");
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&bad), Err(FramingError::BadComp));
}
#[test]
fn framing_rejects_truncated_input() {
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&[]), Err(FramingError::Short));
assert_eq!(
decompress_payload(&[FRAMING_VERSION]),
Err(FramingError::Short)
);
}
#[test]
fn framing_rejects_corrupt_zlib_body() {
let mut bad = vec![FRAMING_VERSION, COMP_ZLIB];
bad.extend_from_slice(b"this is not zlib data");
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&bad), Err(FramingError::Zlib));
}
#[test]
fn framing_rejects_zlib_bomb_over_limit() {
// A tiny compressed frame that decompresses past MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES
// must be rejected, not allocated. Zeros compress to a handful of bytes.
let huge = vec![0u8; (MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES as usize) + 1];
let framed = compress_payload(&huge);
assert!(framed.len() < huge.len() / 100, "bomb frame compresses hugely");
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&framed), Err(FramingError::Zlib));
}
#[test]
fn framing_accepts_payload_at_limit() {
// Exactly at the ceiling must still round-trip.
let big = vec![7u8; MAX_DECOMPRESSED_BYTES as usize];
let framed = compress_payload(&big);
assert_eq!(decompress_payload(&framed).unwrap(), big);
}
#[test]
fn pipe_auth_sign_verify_binds_nonce_and_connection() {
let sk = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[9u8; 32]);
let pk = sk.verifying_key().to_bytes();
let nonce = [0x11u8; 32];
let cid = [0x22u8; 32];
let sig = sign_pipe_auth(&sk, &nonce, &cid);
assert!(verify_pipe_auth(&pk, &nonce, &cid, &sig));
// Different nonce or connection_id → invalid (anti-replay / rebind).
assert!(!verify_pipe_auth(&pk, &[0x12u8; 32], &cid, &sig));
assert!(!verify_pipe_auth(&pk, &nonce, &[0x23u8; 32], &sig));
// Domain separation: an AUTH_DOMAIN signature must not verify here.
let auth_sig = sign_challenge(&sk, &nonce);
assert!(!verify_pipe_auth(&pk, &nonce, &cid, &auth_sig));
}
#[test]
fn pipe_key_is_symmetric_over_ephemeral_dh() {
// Two fresh ephemeral X25519 keypairs derive the same pipe key.
let a = derive_keys(&[1u8; 32]);
let b = derive_keys(&[2u8; 32]);
let ka = derive_pipe_key(&ecdh(&a.x25519_priv, &b.x25519_pub));
let kb = derive_pipe_key(&ecdh(&b.x25519_priv, &a.x25519_pub));
assert_eq!(ka, kb);
}
#[test]
fn pipe_signal_framing_round_trip() {
let body = b"\x82\xa1k\x01"; // arbitrary msgpack-ish bytes
let framed = frame_pipe_signal(body);
assert!(is_pipe_signal(&framed));
assert_eq!(unframe_pipe_signal(&framed), Some(&body[..]));
// A normal v2 app frame is NOT a pipe signal and won't unframe.
let app = compress_payload(b"{}");
assert!(!is_pipe_signal(&app));
assert_eq!(unframe_pipe_signal(&app), None);
}
}