Files
Skald-Circle/src/frontend/api/marketplace.rs
T
Daniele 2dad4824c9 fix(mcp): rebuild the prompt prefix when the connector set changes
The `## MCP servers` table lives inside the frozen system prefix, which
PrefixCache holds for twenty idle minutes. Refreshing a user's global-access
snapshot fixed what `mcp.tools()` offers but left the table describing the
world before the change, so an admin could enable a connector, ask for it in an
open conversation, and be told in good faith that it does not exist — with the
tools sitting right there. Same gap on a reinstall, whose new
llm_short_description reached the runtime and not the prompt.

Both refreshes now call `invalidate_prefixes()` on the live contexts they were
already iterating, the seam the skill tools use. Order matters and runs against
the intuition: `render_mcp_list` renders the runtime's in-RAM state, not the
DB, so the invalidation goes last — after the snapshot refresh and after the
servers restart. Rebuild earlier and the prefix is repopulated from the very
descriptions being replaced, with nothing left to invalidate it a second time.
In the reinstall that means waiting out a dependency install; those users were
already reading a stale table, and an early rebuild would only freeze the stale
one in place.

Also warn when a feed's connector.json and index disagree on the integer
version. The manifest silently wins, so if the index is the lower of the two
the strict `feed > installed` comparison is false forever: the connector never
offers an Update and nothing anywhere says why.
2026-08-10 13:20:26 +01:00

1259 lines
55 KiB
Rust

//! Connector marketplace — a remote feed of vetted connectors (blueprint §14/§15).
//!
//! The feed is **consultative, not authoritative**: it *proposes* connectors, the
//! admin *installs* one into `mcp_catalog`, and only then can it be enabled
//! globally (`mcp_global_servers`) or activated per-user (`mcp_user_servers`).
//! The trust anchor stays on the box, so §14's risk axis is untouched — importing
//! an `mcp_local` entry writes a script that will execute here, and therefore
//! still demands the admin-only `mcp.register_local_script` on top of
//! `mcp.manage_catalog`.
//!
//! Everything is fetched **server-side**: the feed serves no CORS headers, so a
//! browser cannot read it directly, and proxying also keeps the household's
//! browsing pattern off the open web (only the box's IP reaches the feed, and it
//! pulls the whole index rather than querying per connector).
//!
//! ## What the digests do and do not buy
//!
//! Each manifest declares a SHA-256 per file, and [`install`] refuses any file
//! that does not match — fail-closed. That is **pinning**, not authenticity: the
//! digest arrives over the same channel as the file, so whoever can serve a
//! modified script can serve its modified digest too. What it buys is that the
//! hash recorded at install time makes any *later* silent change detectable — no
//! quiet code update on the box. Real authenticity needs the index signed by a key
//! that does not live on the web server; the format is ready for it, the check is
//! not written yet.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use axum::extract::{Extension, Path, Query, State};
use axum::http::header;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use axum::Json;
use core_api::system_bus::SystemEvent;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use skald_core::db::access_defaults;
use skald_core::db::{mcp_catalog, role_capabilities};
use skald_core::skald::Skald;
use super::guard::AuthUser;
use super::ApiError;
/// The configured feed URL (`marketplace.url` in `config.yml`), installed by
/// [`crate::frontend::WebFrontend::new`] at startup.
static FEED_URL: std::sync::OnceLock<String> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
/// Installs the feed URL from config. Called once during frontend construction;
/// later calls are ignored, so concurrent callers (e.g. tests) cannot race it.
pub fn set_feed_url(url: String) {
let _ = FEED_URL.set(url.trim_end_matches('/').to_string());
}
/// Where the feed lives. Falls back to the public host when nothing configured it
/// — a missing `marketplace:` block should degrade to the default, not to a
/// panic.
fn base_url() -> String {
FEED_URL
.get()
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(|| "https://connectors.skaldagent.net".to_string())
}
/// How long a hydrated feed stays warm. The feed changes rarely; the admin can
/// force a refetch from the UI.
const CACHE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);
/// Refuses a file the feed declares as absurdly large before downloading it. Files
/// are verified in memory, so this also bounds the allocation.
const MAX_FILE_BYTES: u64 = 8 * 1024 * 1024;
static HTTP: LazyLock<reqwest::Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(20))
.user_agent(concat!("skald/", env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")))
.build()
.expect("marketplace http client")
});
// ── the feed's wire format ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Deliberately tolerant: the feed evolves alongside this client, so every field
// the client can derive itself is optional and unknown fields are ignored. The
// feed's vocabulary is NOT Skald's — see `norm_*` below for the translation.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
struct IndexEntry {
id: String,
#[serde(default)] name: Option<String>,
/// The index is the single place that names files and their digests, which is
/// what makes it the one document worth signing: verify it, and every artifact
/// below is anchored. (A manifest cannot carry its own digest — writing the
/// hash into the file changes the file.)
#[serde(default)] files: Vec<FileEntry>,
/// `icon_small` is the current spelling; `small_icon` was the earlier one.
#[serde(default, alias = "small_icon")] icon_small: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, alias = "large_icon")] icon_large: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] user_description: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] requires: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)] tags: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)] folder: Option<String>,
/// `user` | `global` — the feed's word for §7 placement.
#[serde(default)] scope: Option<String>,
/// `mcp_local` | `mcp_remote` — the §14 risk axis.
#[serde(default, rename = "type")] kind: Option<String>,
/// Versioning (§ marketplace updates): `version` is the monotonic **integer**
/// build number — the comparison key for "update available". Tolerant of a
/// legacy string `version` during the schema migration (parsed to `None`).
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "de_flexible_i64")] version: Option<i64>,
#[serde(default)] version_string: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] version_release_date: Option<String>,
}
/// Deserializes an optional integer that may arrive as a JSON number or (during the
/// string-`version` → integer-`version` migration) as a numeric string. A
/// non-numeric string (`"2.0.1"`) yields `None` rather than a hard parse error, so
/// one un-migrated entry never fails the whole feed.
fn de_flexible_i64<'de, D>(d: D) -> Result<Option<i64>, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
let v = Option::<serde_json::Value>::deserialize(d)?;
Ok(v.and_then(|v| match v {
serde_json::Value::Number(n) => n.as_i64(),
serde_json::Value::String(s) => s.trim().parse::<i64>().ok(),
_ => None,
}))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct Index {
#[serde(default)] connectors: Vec<IndexEntry>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
struct FileEntry {
path: String,
sha256: String,
#[serde(default)] size: Option<u64>,
}
/// How a connector authenticates. `delivery` matters because Skald's remote
/// transport sends a key as `Authorization: Bearer`, while some servers (Tavily)
/// want it as a query parameter — which they express as a `{key}` placeholder in
/// the URL that `skald_core::mcp` substitutes at connect time. The placeholder is
/// what actually drives the substitution, so the feed's `param` name is not read.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
struct AuthSpec {
#[serde(default, rename = "type")] kind: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] delivery: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] scopes: Vec<String>,
/// oauth: the identity provider slug (`google`) — resolved to client creds +
/// endpoints from the `oauth_providers` registry table (§15). Never carries
/// URLs or secrets: those stay out of the public feed by design.
#[serde(default)] provider: Option<String>,
/// oauth: how the obtained credential is delivered to the server process
/// (`{as,format,env,path}`). Parsed with skald-core's own type so the stored
/// snapshot and the runtime injector agree on the shape.
#[serde(default)] deliver: Option<skald_core::mcp::DeliverSpec>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
struct Doc {
#[serde(default)] description: Option<String>,
/// The text the LLM reads when deciding whether to `activate_tools()` on this
/// server (tools are lazy-loaded), so it maps to `mcp_catalog.description` —
/// the column that reaches the prompt. The human-facing blurb is
/// `IndexEntry::user_description` and stays in the UI.
#[serde(default)] llm_short_description: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
struct McpConfigManifest {
#[serde(default)] command: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] args: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)] env: HashMap<String, String>,
#[serde(default)] url: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] transport: Option<String>,
}
/// One env/secret field the activation UI must collect (the feed's `env[]` entry).
/// Richer than the old `Vec<String>` of bare key names — drives a real form.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct EnvEntry {
name: String,
label: String,
description: String,
#[serde(default)] required: bool,
#[serde(default)] secret: bool,
#[serde(default)] default: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] example: Option<String>,
}
/// The verify-before-save step. `command` is a shell snippet run with the
/// collected env/secret injected; `timeout_secs` defaults to 15.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
struct VerifySpec {
command: String,
#[serde(default)] timeout_secs: Option<u64>,
}
/// One entry of the manifest's optional `tools[]` block: a friendly display name
/// for a raw MCP tool. Snapshotted into `mcp_catalog.tool_meta_json` and used as the
/// authoritative UI card title (override > live MCP `title` > prettified raw name).
/// Icons are not per-tool — a connector's own icon covers all its tools.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct ToolMeta {
name: String,
#[serde(default)] display_name: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
struct Manifest {
#[serde(default)] name: Option<String>,
/// The monotonic **integer** build number (see [`IndexEntry::version`]). Tolerant
/// of a legacy string during migration.
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "de_flexible_i64")] version: Option<i64>,
#[serde(default)] version_string: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] version_release_date: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, rename = "type")] kind: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] transport: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] requires: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)] dependencies: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)] setup_instructions: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)] docs: Vec<Doc>,
#[serde(default)] mcp_config: Option<McpConfigManifest>,
#[serde(default)] homepage: Option<String>,
/// Digests now live in the index (the signable root); kept here only so an
/// older feed still installs.
#[serde(default)] files: Vec<FileEntry>,
#[serde(default)] scope: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)] auth: Option<AuthSpec>,
/// The full env/secret schema for the activation form (objects, not key names).
#[serde(default)] env: Vec<EnvEntry>,
/// Optional verify-before-save command.
#[serde(default)] verify: Option<VerifySpec>,
/// Optional friendly display names for the connector's tools (UI card titles).
#[serde(default)] tools: Vec<ToolMeta>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct Hydrated {
entry: IndexEntry,
manifest: Manifest,
/// The manifest exactly as served, so [`install`] can record it verbatim
/// without a second fetch. `None` when the manifest could not be read.
manifest_raw: Option<String>,
}
// ── feed vocabulary → Skald vocabulary ────────────────────────────────────────
/// §7 placement: does this run once for the household (host runtime) or once per
/// user (inside their container)? The feed says `user`, the catalog says
/// `per_user`.
///
/// Placement is **not** transport: a remote connector can be per-user (a personal
/// API key — `mcp.register_remote` exists precisely for that), and the inference
/// from `mcp_remote` → global only happens to hold for today's two entries. So the
/// feed's explicit `scope` always wins; the inference is a last resort, and it
/// resolves to `per_user`, the narrower blast radius.
fn norm_scope(entry: &IndexEntry, manifest: &Manifest) -> String {
let declared = manifest.scope.as_deref().or(entry.scope.as_deref());
match declared {
Some("global") => "global".to_string(),
Some("user") | Some("per_user") => "per_user".to_string(),
_ => "per_user".to_string(),
}
}
/// §14 risk axis: does installing this write code that will execute on the box?
/// `mcp_local` does, and that is the gated act — not "remote vs local" as such.
fn norm_source(entry: &IndexEntry, manifest: &Manifest) -> String {
let declared = manifest.kind.as_deref().or(entry.kind.as_deref());
match declared {
Some("mcp_remote") => "remote".to_string(),
Some("mcp_local") => "local_script".to_string(),
// The index carries no `type` today. Fall back to the tags it does carry,
// then to `local_script` — the answer that demands MORE authority, so a
// silent misread cannot under-gate an install.
_ if entry.tags.iter().any(|t| t == "remote") => "remote".to_string(),
_ => "local_script".to_string(),
}
}
/// `skald_core::mcp::transport_of` maps `http`→Http, `sse`→Sse and **everything
/// else to Stdio**. The feed says `streamable-http`, which would therefore fall
/// through to Stdio and try to spawn a command that does not exist — a silent
/// failure, not an error. Normalise here so only the three understood values are
/// ever stored.
fn norm_transport(manifest: &Manifest, source: &str) -> String {
let declared = manifest
.mcp_config
.as_ref()
.and_then(|c| c.transport.as_deref())
.or(manifest.transport.as_deref());
match declared {
Some("streamable-http") | Some("http") => "http".to_string(),
Some("sse") => "sse".to_string(),
Some("stdio") => "stdio".to_string(),
_ if source == "remote" => "http".to_string(),
_ => "stdio".to_string(),
}
}
/// The catalog's `auth_kind` vocabulary. Prefers the manifest's structured `auth`
/// block and falls back to the coarse `requires` list.
///
/// Only `none` and `api_key` are wired in the activation path today (§15's OAuth /
/// QR / SSH elicitation flow is deferred), so `oauth` here is an honest label on a
/// connector that cannot yet complete its login, not a working mode.
fn norm_auth_kind(entry: &IndexEntry, manifest: &Manifest) -> String {
if let Some(k) = manifest.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.kind.as_deref()) {
return match k {
"oauth2" | "oauth" => "oauth".to_string(),
"api_key" => "api_key".to_string(),
"qr" => "qr".to_string(),
"ssh_key" => "ssh_key".to_string(),
_ => "none".to_string(),
};
}
let requires: Vec<&str> = manifest
.requires
.iter()
.chain(entry.requires.iter())
.map(|s| s.as_str())
.collect();
if requires.iter().any(|r| r.eq_ignore_ascii_case("oauth")) {
"oauth".to_string()
} else if requires.iter().any(|r| r.eq_ignore_ascii_case("api_key")) {
"api_key".to_string()
} else {
"none".to_string()
}
}
/// The files to install, with their digests. The index is authoritative (it is the
/// document a signature would cover); a manifest-side list is honoured only when
/// the index carries none.
fn files_of<'a>(entry: &'a IndexEntry, manifest: &'a Manifest) -> &'a [FileEntry] {
if entry.files.is_empty() {
&manifest.files
} else {
&entry.files
}
}
// ── the card the admin UI renders ─────────────────────────────────────────────
/// One marketplace entry, already translated into Skald's vocabulary so the UI
/// filters on the same words the catalog stores.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct MarketplaceCard {
pub id: String,
pub name: String,
/// The feed's build number (integer) and its display metadata.
pub version: Option<i64>,
pub version_string: Option<String>,
pub version_release_date: Option<String>,
/// The installed catalog row's build number, when installed. `update_available`
/// is `true` when the feed's `version` is strictly greater.
pub installed_version: Option<i64>,
pub update_available: bool,
/// `per_user` | `global`
pub scope: String,
/// `remote` | `local_script`
pub source: String,
pub transport: String,
pub user_description: Option<String>,
pub llm_description: Option<String>,
pub requires: Vec<String>,
pub tags: Vec<String>,
pub homepage: Option<String>,
pub auth_kind: String,
/// `header` | `query` — how the server wants its key. Shown because a `query`
/// connector only works via the URL's `{key}` placeholder.
pub auth_delivery: Option<String>,
/// The OAuth scopes this connector will ask each user to grant. The admin
/// should see the blast radius of a consent before importing it.
pub oauth_scopes: Vec<String>,
pub dependencies: Vec<String>,
pub setup_instructions: Vec<String>,
pub file_count: usize,
pub has_icon: bool,
/// Already present in `mcp_catalog` under this id.
pub installed: bool,
}
fn card_of(h: &Hydrated, installed: bool, installed_version: Option<i64>) -> MarketplaceCard {
let source = norm_source(&h.entry, &h.manifest);
let doc = h.manifest.docs.first().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
// Prefer the manifest's version trio, falling back to the index entry's.
// A disagreement between the two is a malformed feed and is otherwise completely
// invisible: the manifest silently wins, `installed_version` keeps whatever the
// install snapshotted, and if the feed's index is the lower of the two the strict
// `feed > have` below is false forever — the connector never offers an Update and
// nothing anywhere says why. Say it once, in the log.
if let (Some(m), Some(e)) = (h.manifest.version, h.entry.version) {
if m != e {
tracing::warn!(
connector = %h.entry.id, manifest_version = m, index_version = e,
"marketplace feed version desync: connector.json and the index disagree; the manifest wins",
);
}
}
let version = h.manifest.version.or(h.entry.version);
let version_string = h.manifest.version_string.clone().or_else(|| h.entry.version_string.clone());
let version_release_date = h.manifest.version_release_date.clone().or_else(|| h.entry.version_release_date.clone());
// "Update available" is a strict integer bump on an already-installed connector.
let update_available = matches!((version, installed_version), (Some(feed), Some(have)) if feed > have);
MarketplaceCard {
id: h.entry.id.clone(),
name: h.entry.name.clone()
.or_else(|| h.manifest.name.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| h.entry.id.clone()),
version,
version_string,
version_release_date,
installed_version,
update_available,
scope: norm_scope(&h.entry, &h.manifest),
transport: norm_transport(&h.manifest, &source),
source,
user_description: h.entry.user_description.clone().or(doc.description.clone()),
llm_description: doc.llm_short_description.clone(),
requires: if h.manifest.requires.is_empty() {
h.entry.requires.clone()
} else {
h.manifest.requires.clone()
},
tags: h.entry.tags.clone(),
homepage: h.manifest.homepage.clone(),
auth_kind: norm_auth_kind(&h.entry, &h.manifest),
auth_delivery: h.manifest.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.delivery.clone()),
oauth_scopes: h.manifest.auth.as_ref().map(|a| a.scopes.clone()).unwrap_or_default(),
dependencies: h.manifest.dependencies.clone(),
setup_instructions: h.manifest.setup_instructions.clone(),
file_count: files_of(&h.entry, &h.manifest).len(),
has_icon: h.entry.icon_small.is_some() || h.entry.icon_large.is_some(),
installed,
}
}
// ── fetching + cache ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
struct Cache {
fetched: Instant,
feed: Vec<Hydrated>,
}
static CACHE: LazyLock<RwLock<Option<Cache>>> = LazyLock::new(|| RwLock::new(None));
fn folder_of(entry: &IndexEntry) -> String {
entry.folder.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| entry.id.clone())
}
/// Pulls the index, then every `connector.json` concurrently. The N+1 is only
/// tolerable because the index is small and cached — once the index carries `type`
/// and `scope` for every entry, the listing collapses to a single fetch.
async fn fetch_feed() -> Result<Vec<Hydrated>, ApiError> {
let base = base_url();
let index: Index = HTTP
.get(format!("{base}/connectors.json"))
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot reach the marketplace at {base}: {e}")))?
.error_for_status()
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("marketplace returned an error: {e}")))?
.json()
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("marketplace index is not valid JSON: {e}")))?;
let mut set = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
for entry in index.connectors {
let base = base.clone();
set.spawn(async move {
let url = format!("{}/{}/connector.json", base, folder_of(&entry));
// A manifest that fails to load degrades that one card to whatever the
// index said; it never fails the whole listing. The raw text is kept
// alongside the parsed form so `install` can record what was served
// even if some field of it did not parse.
let (manifest, manifest_raw) = match HTTP.get(&url).send().await {
Ok(r) => match r.text().await {
Ok(t) => (serde_json::from_str::<Manifest>(&t).unwrap_or_default(), Some(t)),
Err(_) => (Manifest::default(), None),
},
Err(_) => (Manifest::default(), None),
};
Hydrated { entry, manifest, manifest_raw }
});
}
let mut feed = Vec::new();
while let Some(joined) = set.join_next().await {
if let Ok(h) = joined {
feed.push(h);
}
}
feed.sort_by(|a, b| a.entry.id.cmp(&b.entry.id));
Ok(feed)
}
/// The hydrated feed, from cache when warm.
async fn feed(force: bool) -> Result<Vec<Hydrated>, ApiError> {
if !force {
if let Some(c) = CACHE.read().await.as_ref() {
if c.fetched.elapsed() < CACHE_TTL {
return Ok(c.feed.clone());
}
}
}
let fresh = fetch_feed().await?;
*CACHE.write().await = Some(Cache { fetched: Instant::now(), feed: fresh.clone() });
Ok(fresh)
}
// ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async fn require_cap(skald: &Skald, user_id: &str, cap: &str) -> Result<(), ApiError> {
let user = skald_core::db::users::get(skald.db(), user_id)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::unauthorized("unknown user"))?;
if role_capabilities::has(skald.db(), &user.role_id, cap).await? {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(ApiError::forbidden(format!("your role lacks the capability `{cap}`")))
}
}
fn sha256_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
let mut h = Sha256::new();
h.update(bytes);
h.finalize().iter().fold(String::with_capacity(64), |mut s, b| {
use std::fmt::Write;
let _ = write!(s, "{b:02x}");
s
})
}
/// Rejects a feed-supplied path that could escape the connector's own folder.
/// The feed is only semi-trusted (§14) — a hostile or compromised manifest must
/// not be able to name `../../config.yml` and have us write there.
fn safe_rel_path(p: &str) -> Result<&str, ApiError> {
let bad = p.is_empty()
|| p.starts_with('/')
|| p.contains('\\')
|| p.contains(':')
|| std::path::Path::new(p)
.components()
.any(|c| !matches!(c, std::path::Component::Normal(_)));
if bad {
return Err(ApiError::bad_request(format!(
"manifest declares an unsafe file path: `{p}`"
)));
}
Ok(p)
}
// ── GET /api/mcp/marketplace ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct ListQuery {
#[serde(default)]
pub refresh: bool,
}
/// The whole feed, translated and marked with what is already installed. Search
/// and filtering happen client-side: the list is small, and one payload keeps the
/// UI responsive without a round trip per keystroke.
pub async fn list(
State(skald): State<Arc<Skald>>,
Extension(auth): Extension<AuthUser>,
Query(q): Query<ListQuery>,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
require_cap(&skald, &auth.user_id, role_capabilities::MANAGE_CATALOG).await?;
let feed = feed(q.refresh).await?;
// name → installed build number (present = installed; the value drives the
// "update available" comparison, `None` for a pre-versioning install).
let installed: std::collections::HashMap<String, Option<i64>> = mcp_catalog::list(skald.db())
.await?
.into_iter()
.map(|r| (r.name, r.version))
.collect();
let cards: Vec<MarketplaceCard> = feed
.iter()
.map(|h| card_of(h, installed.contains_key(&h.entry.id), installed.get(&h.entry.id).copied().flatten()))
.collect();
Ok(Json(json!({ "base_url": base_url(), "connectors": cards })))
}
// ── GET /api/mcp/marketplace/{id}/icon ────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct IconQuery {
#[serde(default)]
pub size: Option<String>,
}
/// Proxies a connector icon. Needed because the feed sends no CORS headers, so the
/// page cannot load the image directly.
pub async fn icon(
State(skald): State<Arc<Skald>>,
Extension(auth): Extension<AuthUser>,
Path(id): Path<String>,
Query(q): Query<IconQuery>,
) -> Result<Response, ApiError> {
require_cap(&skald, &auth.user_id, role_capabilities::MANAGE_CATALOG).await?;
let feed = feed(false).await?;
let h = feed
.iter()
.find(|h| h.entry.id == id)
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found(format!("no marketplace connector `{id}`")))?;
let large = q.size.as_deref() == Some("lg");
let rel = if large {
h.entry.icon_large.clone().or_else(|| h.entry.icon_small.clone())
} else {
h.entry.icon_small.clone().or_else(|| h.entry.icon_large.clone())
}
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found("connector declares no icon"))?;
// The index's icon paths are relative to the feed root, not the folder.
let url = format!("{}/{}", base_url(), rel.trim_start_matches('/'));
let res = HTTP
.get(&url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot fetch icon: {e}")))?
.error_for_status()
.map_err(|e| ApiError::not_found(format!("icon unavailable: {e}")))?;
let ct = res
.headers()
.get(header::CONTENT_TYPE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
.to_string();
let bytes = res
.bytes()
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot read icon: {e}")))?;
Ok((
[
(header::CONTENT_TYPE, ct),
(header::CACHE_CONTROL, "public, max-age=3600".to_string()),
],
bytes,
)
.into_response())
}
// ── POST /api/mcp/marketplace/install ─────────────────────────────────────────
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct InstallBody {
pub id: String,
}
/// Imports a feed entry into `mcp_catalog` — the act that moves a connector from
/// "someone else vetted this" to "this household's admin accepted it". It downloads
/// and hash-verifies the connector's folder into `./connectors/<id>/`; for an
/// `mcp_local` entry that folder holds code which will run on this box, and
/// therefore needs `mcp.register_local_script` (§14) on top of `mcp.manage_catalog`.
///
/// Installing does **not** activate: a global entry still needs the admin to
/// enable it with a key, a per-user one still needs each user to activate it.
pub async fn install(
State(skald): State<Arc<Skald>>,
Extension(auth): Extension<AuthUser>,
Json(body): Json<InstallBody>,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
require_cap(&skald, &auth.user_id, role_capabilities::MANAGE_CATALOG).await?;
// An install (or reinstall) always pulls the **current** feed, never the 300 s
// browse cache: a reinstall exists precisely to pick up a changed manifest
// (new `llm_short_description`, icon, code), so reading a stale snapshot would
// silently reapply the old metadata. Browsing the list stays cached; the
// mutating path fetches fresh.
let feed = feed(true).await?;
let h = feed
.iter()
.find(|h| h.entry.id == body.id)
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::not_found(format!("no marketplace connector `{}`", body.id)))?;
let source = norm_source(&h.entry, &h.manifest);
let scope = norm_scope(&h.entry, &h.manifest);
let transport = norm_transport(&h.manifest, &source);
let cfg = h.manifest.mcp_config.clone().unwrap_or_default();
let doc = h.manifest.docs.first().cloned().unwrap_or_default();
if source == "local_script" {
require_cap(&skald, &auth.user_id, role_capabilities::REGISTER_LOCAL_SCRIPT).await?;
}
// Download + verify before touching the catalog, so a failed digest leaves no
// trace of a half-installed connector. A `local_script` always downloads its
// files; a `remote` connector downloads them only if it declares a `verify`
// step that references a script (otherwise there is nothing to fetch).
let verify_command = h.manifest.verify.as_ref().map(|v| v.command.clone());
let verify_timeout = h.manifest.verify.as_ref().and_then(|v| v.timeout_secs);
let all_files = files_of(&h.entry, &h.manifest);
let verify_script_rel = verify_command
.as_deref()
.and_then(|c| verify_script_of(c, &all_files));
let verify_script_path = verify_script_rel
.as_ref()
.map(|f| format!("{}/{}", body.id, f));
// Every source downloads its folder now — a remote connector has an icon and a
// manifest to record even when it has no code to run here.
let installed =
download_verified(&h.entry, &h.manifest, h.manifest_raw.as_deref(), &source).await?;
let script_path = if source == "local_script" {
let entry_file = cfg
.args
.first()
.cloned()
.ok_or_else(|| ApiError::bad_request(
"manifest has no mcp_config.args[0] naming the script to run",
))?;
let entry_file = safe_rel_path(&entry_file)?.to_string();
Some(format!("{}/{}", body.id, entry_file))
} else {
None
};
let args_json = if source == "local_script" {
// `activate` rewrites args to the in-container path when it copies the
// script into the user's home, so what is stored here is only a template.
None
} else if cfg.args.is_empty() {
None
} else {
serde_json::to_string(&cfg.args).ok()
};
// The full env/secret schema for the activation form. The manifest's top-level
// `env[]` (array of objects with label/description/required/secret/…) is the
// source of truth; if a feed only ships the old `mcp_config.env` placeholder
// map, fall back to bare key names so the form still renders.
let config_schema_json = if !h.manifest.env.is_empty() {
serde_json::to_string(&h.manifest.env).ok()
} else if !cfg.env.is_empty() {
let names: Vec<String> = cfg.env.keys().cloned().collect();
serde_json::to_string(&names).ok()
} else {
None
};
let _ = verify_timeout; // surfaced to the runtime via the verify module's default
let folder = folder_of(&h.entry);
let icon_small_path = installed_icon(h.entry.icon_small.as_deref(), &folder, &installed);
let icon_large_path = installed_icon(h.entry.icon_large.as_deref(), &folder, &installed);
// An update or re-install keeps the audience the admin has curated since; only
// a first install applies the default one (`db::access_defaults`).
let is_new_entry = mcp_catalog::get_by_name(skald.db(), &h.entry.id).await?.is_none();
let id = mcp_catalog::upsert(
skald.db(),
mcp_catalog::UpsertCatalog {
name: &h.entry.id,
scope: &scope,
source: &source,
transport: &transport,
command: cfg.command.as_deref(),
args_json,
env_json: if cfg.env.is_empty() { None } else { serde_json::to_string(&cfg.env).ok() },
url: cfg.url.as_deref(),
script_path: script_path.as_deref(),
config_schema_json,
auth_kind: &norm_auth_kind(&h.entry, &h.manifest),
// OAuth wiring (§15): provider slug, the scopes shown at consent, and the
// credential delivery spec — all snapshotted so an activation is
// reproducible even if the feed later changes.
oauth_provider: h.manifest.auth.as_ref().and_then(|a| a.provider.as_deref()),
oauth_scopes_json: h.manifest.auth.as_ref()
.filter(|a| !a.scopes.is_empty())
.and_then(|a| serde_json::to_string(&a.scopes).ok()),
deliver_json: h.manifest.auth.as_ref()
.and_then(|a| a.deliver.as_ref())
.and_then(|d| serde_json::to_string(d).ok()),
role_filter: None,
verify_command: verify_command.as_deref(),
verify_script_path: verify_script_path.as_deref(),
icon_small_path: icon_small_path.as_deref(),
icon_large_path: icon_large_path.as_deref(),
friendly_name: h.entry.name.as_deref().or(h.manifest.name.as_deref()),
// The LLM-facing blurb — this is the column `render_mcp_list` puts in
// the prompt for `activate_tools()`, so the feed's
// `llm_short_description` belongs here, not the human `user_description`.
description: doc
.llm_short_description
.as_deref()
.or(h.entry.user_description.as_deref()),
// Snapshot the manifest's friendly tool names for the UI card titles.
tool_meta_json: (!h.manifest.tools.is_empty())
.then(|| serde_json::to_string(&h.manifest.tools).ok())
.flatten(),
// Snapshot the feed's version so a later listing can compare it against a
// newer feed and surface "update available". Manifest wins over index.
version: h.manifest.version.or(h.entry.version),
version_string: h.manifest.version_string.as_deref()
.or(h.entry.version_string.as_deref()),
version_release_date: h.manifest.version_release_date.as_deref()
.or(h.entry.version_release_date.as_deref()),
},
)
.await?;
// Authorize the standard audience to activate it, so an installed connector is
// usable by the household without a second pass on the Users page. Best-effort
// and additive: a failure leaves grants to be set by hand, never withdraws one.
if is_new_entry {
match access_defaults::seed_new_object(
skald.db(),
access_defaults::Grantable::Catalog(&h.entry.id),
).await {
Ok(0) => {}
Ok(n) => tracing::info!(connector = %h.entry.id, users = n, "connector granted to auto-grant users"),
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(connector = %h.entry.id, error = %e, "default connector grants failed (non-fatal)"),
}
}
// Announce the (re)install so anything already running it catches up without
// waiting for each user's next login: enabled global servers re-snapshot the
// description and restart; each live user who activated it gets its files/deps
// reconciled and the connector restarted with the fresh `llm_short_description`.
// A first-time install matches nothing live and is a cheap no-op.
//
// On the bus, not awaited: the reaction re-copies files and restarts servers
// inside containers, which can take seconds per live user — the admin's install
// should not block on it, and nothing in the response below depends on it.
skald.system_bus().send(SystemEvent::ConnectorReinstalled {
catalog_name: body.id.clone(),
});
Ok(Json(json!({
"id": id,
"name": h.entry.id,
"scope": scope,
"source": source,
"files_verified": installed.verified,
})))
}
/// If a verify `command` references one of the connector's shipped files (by
/// basename match against `files[]`), return that file's relative path — the
/// caller stores `<id>/<file>` so the runtime resolves `./connectors/<id>/<file>`.
/// Returns `None` for inline commands (`curl …`) with no script file.
fn verify_script_of(command: &str, files: &[FileEntry]) -> Option<String> {
for f in files {
let basename = f.path.rsplit_once('/').map(|(_, b)| b).unwrap_or(&f.path);
if !basename.is_empty() && command.contains(basename) {
return Some(f.path.clone());
}
}
None
}
/// What [`download_verified`] put on disk.
struct Installed {
/// How many files were downloaded and matched their declared digest.
verified: usize,
/// The relative paths actually written, so the caller can record a manifest
/// claim (an icon, say) only once the file backing it exists.
files: std::collections::HashSet<String>,
}
/// Downloads a connector's whole folder into `./connectors/<id>/`, refusing any file
/// whose SHA-256 does not match. All-or-nothing: files are verified in memory and
/// only written once every digest checks out, so a tampered feed never leaves a
/// partial connector on disk.
///
/// Runs for **every** source, not just `local_script`. Fetching an icon is not the
/// §14 risk axis — that axis is about code the box will *execute*, and it stays
/// gated on `mcp.register_local_script` in [`install`]. What lands here for a remote
/// connector is inert: an icon and the manifest.
async fn download_verified(
entry: &IndexEntry,
manifest: &Manifest,
raw: Option<&str>,
source: &str,
) -> Result<Installed, ApiError> {
let files = files_of(entry, manifest);
if files.is_empty() && source == "local_script" {
return Err(ApiError::bad_request(
"the feed declares no `files` with digests for this connector — \
refusing to install unverifiable code (§14)",
));
}
let base = base_url();
let folder = folder_of(entry);
let index_digests = !entry.files.is_empty();
let mut staged: Vec<(String, Vec<u8>)> = Vec::new();
for f in files {
let rel = safe_rel_path(&f.path)?;
// A document can never carry its own digest (writing the hash into the file
// changes the file), so a *manifest*-declared self-entry is unverifiable by
// construction. From the index it is verifiable, and gets no exception.
if rel == skald_core::mcp::MANIFEST_FILE && !index_digests {
continue;
}
if let Some(sz) = f.size {
if sz > MAX_FILE_BYTES {
return Err(ApiError::bad_request(format!(
"`{rel}` declares {sz} bytes, over the {MAX_FILE_BYTES} limit"
)));
}
}
let url = format!("{base}/{folder}/{rel}");
let bytes = HTTP
.get(&url)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot download `{rel}`: {e}")))?
.error_for_status()
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot download `{rel}`: {e}")))?
.bytes()
.await
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot read `{rel}`: {e}")))?;
let got = sha256_hex(&bytes);
if !got.eq_ignore_ascii_case(f.sha256.trim()) {
return Err(ApiError::bad_request(format!(
"digest mismatch on `{rel}`: the manifest declares {} but the served \
file hashes to {got}. Refusing to install.",
f.sha256
)));
}
staged.push((rel.to_string(), bytes.to_vec()));
}
if staged.is_empty() && source == "local_script" {
return Err(ApiError::bad_request(
"manifest declares no installable file besides connector.json",
));
}
let dest = skald_core::mcp::connector_dir(&entry.id)
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot resolve the connectors dir: {e}")))?;
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dest)
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot create {}: {e}", dest.display())))?;
let verified = staged.len();
let mut written: std::collections::HashSet<String> = std::collections::HashSet::new();
for (rel, bytes) in staged {
let path = dest.join(&rel);
if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot create dir for `{rel}`: {e}")))?;
}
std::fs::write(&path, &bytes)
.map_err(|e| ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot write `{rel}`: {e}")))?;
written.insert(rel);
}
// The manifest, recorded verbatim. The feed does not digest it (it lists only
// the folder's other files), and it does not need to be: nothing ever reads this
// file back — `mcp_catalog` drives every connect. Its one job is to say what was
// served on the day the admin accepted it, and for that job a tampered copy is
// still the truth of what we accepted. See the module header on what digests do
// and do not buy.
if !written.contains(skald_core::mcp::MANIFEST_FILE) {
if let Some(raw) = raw {
std::fs::write(dest.join(skald_core::mcp::MANIFEST_FILE), raw).map_err(|e| {
ApiError::bad_request(format!("cannot record connector.json: {e}"))
})?;
}
}
Ok(Installed { verified, files: written })
}
/// The icon path to record in the catalog: the manifest's feed-root-relative claim
/// (`gmail/icon_sm.svg`) reduced to a path inside the connector's own folder
/// (`icon_sm.svg`), and only if that file actually got installed.
///
/// The two vocabularies differ — the index names icons from the feed root but names
/// `files[]` from the folder — so this is where they are reconciled.
fn installed_icon(claim: Option<&str>, folder: &str, installed: &Installed) -> Option<String> {
let claim = claim?.trim_start_matches('/');
let rel = claim.strip_prefix(&format!("{folder}/")).unwrap_or(claim);
installed.files.contains(rel).then(|| rel.to_string())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn entry(json: &str) -> IndexEntry {
serde_json::from_str(json).expect("index entry")
}
fn manifest(json: &str) -> Manifest {
serde_json::from_str(json).expect("manifest")
}
/// A feed-supplied path must never escape the connector's own folder. The feed
/// is only semi-trusted (§14) — this is what stops a hostile manifest naming
/// `../../config.yml`.
#[test]
fn rejects_path_traversal_from_the_feed() {
for bad in [
"../../config.yml",
"/etc/passwd",
"a/../../b",
"..",
"",
"C:\\evil",
"dir\\file.py",
] {
assert!(safe_rel_path(bad).is_err(), "should have rejected `{bad}`");
}
for ok in ["server.py", "pkg/server.py", "requirements.txt"] {
assert!(safe_rel_path(ok).is_ok(), "should have accepted `{ok}`");
}
}
/// Placement (§7) is not transport: the feed's explicit `scope` decides, and a
/// feed that says nothing must fall to the narrower blast radius.
#[test]
fn scope_comes_from_the_feed_not_from_the_transport() {
assert_eq!(
norm_scope(&entry(r#"{"id":"t","scope":"global"}"#), &Manifest::default()),
"global"
);
assert_eq!(
norm_scope(&entry(r#"{"id":"g","scope":"user"}"#), &Manifest::default()),
"per_user"
);
// A *remote* connector explicitly scoped per-user stays per-user — this is
// the case `mcp.register_remote` exists for, and the one an infer-from-
// transport shortcut would get wrong.
assert_eq!(
norm_scope(
&entry(r#"{"id":"r","scope":"user","type":"mcp_remote"}"#),
&manifest(r#"{"type":"mcp_remote"}"#)
),
"per_user"
);
// Silence → the narrower answer.
assert_eq!(norm_scope(&entry(r#"{"id":"x"}"#), &Manifest::default()), "per_user");
}
/// An unreadable `type` must resolve to the answer that demands MORE authority,
/// so a misread can never under-gate an install past §14's admin-only check.
#[test]
fn unknown_source_fails_closed_to_local_script() {
assert_eq!(norm_source(&entry(r#"{"id":"x"}"#), &Manifest::default()), "local_script");
assert_eq!(
norm_source(&entry(r#"{"id":"x","type":"mcp_remote"}"#), &Manifest::default()),
"remote"
);
assert_eq!(
norm_source(&entry(r#"{"id":"x","type":"mcp_local"}"#), &Manifest::default()),
"local_script"
);
}
/// `transport_of` in skald-core maps anything unknown to Stdio, so an unmapped
/// `streamable-http` would silently try to spawn a command instead of making an
/// HTTP call.
#[test]
fn streamable_http_normalises_to_http() {
let m = manifest(r#"{"mcp_config":{"transport":"streamable-http","url":"https://x/"}}"#);
assert_eq!(norm_transport(&m, "remote"), "http");
// A remote entry that names no transport still must not become stdio.
assert_eq!(norm_transport(&Manifest::default(), "remote"), "http");
assert_eq!(norm_transport(&Manifest::default(), "local_script"), "stdio");
}
/// The structured `auth` block wins over the coarse `requires` list.
#[test]
fn auth_kind_prefers_the_structured_block() {
let m = manifest(r#"{"auth":{"type":"oauth2","scopes":["a","b"]},"requires":["API_KEY"]}"#);
assert_eq!(norm_auth_kind(&entry(r#"{"id":"x"}"#), &m), "oauth");
let m = manifest(r#"{"auth":{"type":"api_key","delivery":"query","param":"k"}}"#);
assert_eq!(norm_auth_kind(&entry(r#"{"id":"x"}"#), &m), "api_key");
// No auth block → fall back to `requires`.
assert_eq!(
norm_auth_kind(&entry(r#"{"id":"x","requires":["API_KEY"]}"#), &Manifest::default()),
"api_key"
);
}
/// Digests live in the index now; a manifest-side list is only a fallback.
#[test]
fn index_digests_win_over_manifest_digests() {
let e = entry(r#"{"id":"x","files":[{"path":"a.py","sha256":"aa"}]}"#);
let m = manifest(r#"{"files":[{"path":"b.py","sha256":"bb"}]}"#);
assert_eq!(files_of(&e, &m).len(), 1);
assert_eq!(files_of(&e, &m)[0].path, "a.py");
assert_eq!(files_of(&entry(r#"{"id":"x"}"#), &m)[0].path, "b.py");
}
/// The index names icons from the feed root (`gmail/icon_sm.svg`) but names
/// `files[]` from the connector's folder (`icon_sm.svg`). Recording the wrong one
/// would 404 every icon, so this is where the two vocabularies must meet.
#[test]
fn icon_paths_are_reduced_to_the_connector_folder() {
let installed = Installed {
verified: 2,
files: ["icon_sm.svg", "server.py"].iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect(),
};
assert_eq!(
installed_icon(Some("gmail/icon_sm.svg"), "gmail", &installed),
Some("icon_sm.svg".to_string())
);
// A leading slash is still feed-root-relative.
assert_eq!(
installed_icon(Some("/gmail/icon_sm.svg"), "gmail", &installed),
Some("icon_sm.svg".to_string())
);
// Already folder-relative: left alone.
assert_eq!(
installed_icon(Some("icon_sm.svg"), "gmail", &installed),
Some("icon_sm.svg".to_string())
);
// Claimed but never installed → recorded as absent, so the endpoint says
// "no icon" instead of pointing the browser at a file that is not there.
assert_eq!(installed_icon(Some("gmail/icon_lg.svg"), "gmail", &installed), None);
assert_eq!(installed_icon(None, "gmail", &installed), None);
}
#[test]
fn sha256_matches_a_known_vector() {
assert_eq!(
sha256_hex(b"abc"),
"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad"
);
}
/// Installs every connector the live feed offers into a throwaway directory and
/// checks what actually lands: the digests hold, the manifest is recorded, and the
/// icon path stored in the catalog names a file that exists.
///
/// That last one is the whole point of the icon column — a path that does not
/// resolve would 404 silently in the browser and look like "this connector has no
/// icon", which is exactly the failure a unit test with a hand-written feed cannot
/// see. `#[ignore]`d (network + it moves the process cwd, so it must run alone):
/// `cargo test --bin skald -- --ignored live_feed_installs`.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn live_feed_installs_folder_with_icon_and_manifest() {
let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("skald-install-test-{}", std::process::id()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&tmp).unwrap();
std::env::set_current_dir(&tmp).unwrap();
let feed = match fetch_feed().await {
Ok(f) => f,
Err(e) => panic!("feed unreachable: {}", e.message),
};
assert!(!feed.is_empty(), "feed returned no connectors");
for h in &feed {
let source = norm_source(&h.entry, &h.manifest);
let installed =
download_verified(&h.entry, &h.manifest, h.manifest_raw.as_deref(), &source)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("`{}` failed to install: {}", h.entry.id, e.message));
let dir = skald_core::mcp::connector_dir(&h.entry.id).unwrap();
let folder = folder_of(&h.entry);
// Every source installs now — a remote connector included, which is what
// gives Tavily an icon at all.
assert!(dir.is_dir(), "`{}` installed no folder", h.entry.id);
// The manifest is recorded even though the feed does not digest it.
assert!(
dir.join(skald_core::mcp::MANIFEST_FILE).is_file(),
"`{}` recorded no connector.json",
h.entry.id
);
// The icon path the catalog would store must name a real file.
for (size, claim) in [("sm", &h.entry.icon_small), ("lg", &h.entry.icon_large)] {
let Some(rel) = installed_icon(claim.as_deref(), &folder, &installed) else {
panic!("`{}` declares a {size} icon the installer did not keep", h.entry.id);
};
assert!(
dir.join(&rel).is_file(),
"`{}` {size} icon `{rel}` is not on disk",
h.entry.id
);
// An icon must never be shipped into a user's container.
assert!(skald_core::mcp::install::is_host_asset(&rel), "`{rel}` should be a host asset");
}
println!("{:<8} {} files verified, icon + manifest on disk", h.entry.id, installed.verified);
}
std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).ok();
}
/// Hits the real feed. `#[ignore]`d so the suite stays offline-clean; run with
/// `cargo test --bin skald -- --ignored live_feed`.
#[tokio::test]
#[ignore]
async fn live_feed_parses_and_verifies() {
// `main()` installs the process-wide rustls provider before any handshake;
// under the test harness main never runs, so do it here. Ignore the error:
// another test may have installed it already.
let _ = rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
let feed = match fetch_feed().await {
Ok(f) => f,
Err(e) => panic!("feed unreachable: {}", e.message),
};
assert!(!feed.is_empty(), "feed returned no connectors");
for h in &feed {
let c = card_of(h, false, None);
println!(
"{:<8} scope={:<8} source={:<12} transport={:<6} auth={:<7} files={}",
c.id, c.scope, c.source, c.transport, c.auth_kind, c.file_count
);
assert!(matches!(c.scope.as_str(), "per_user" | "global"));
assert!(matches!(c.source.as_str(), "remote" | "local_script"));
// Anything that is not stdio must have been normalised into a value
// `transport_of` actually understands.
assert!(matches!(c.transport.as_str(), "stdio" | "http" | "sse"));
assert!(
c.llm_description.is_some(),
"`{}` has no llm_short_description — the agent would see nothing \
when deciding whether to activate_tools() on it",
c.id
);
}
// Every declared digest must match what the site actually serves.
for h in &feed {
for f in files_of(&h.entry, &h.manifest) {
let url = format!("{}/{}/{}", base_url(), folder_of(&h.entry), f.path);
let bytes = HTTP.get(&url).send().await.unwrap().bytes().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
sha256_hex(&bytes).to_lowercase(),
f.sha256.trim().to_lowercase(),
"digest mismatch for {}/{}",
h.entry.id,
f.path
);
}
}
}
}