- oauth_providers registry table (per-provider client creds) + db/oauth_providers.rs - mcp/oauth.rs: authorization-code + PKCE S256, RAM-only TTL'd flow store, copy-paste consent - mcp/install.rs + verify.rs: connector file install + manifest verification - activate persists a pending row (needs_oauth); /mcp/oauth/start + /complete exchange code for refresh token - credential delivery via env var on docker exec (google_authorized_user JSON), never on disk - mcp_catalog/mcp_user_servers: additive OAuth columns (ensure_column), catalog_name/oauth_provider/deliver_json bare TEXT snapshots - frontend: connector-detail.js (OAuth login panel), shared/connector-common.js, connectors.js admin Sign-in providers modal - API: /mcp/providers (admin OAuth creds), /mcp/oauth/start|complete - .gitignore: add /homes/ (instance data), /connectors/, /reset.sh; drop stale /secrets/
148 lines
5.6 KiB
Rust
148 lines
5.6 KiB
Rust
//! OAuth identity providers for per-user connectors (blueprint §15).
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//!
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//! Registry table in `system.db`: one row per provider (Google, …), keyed by a
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//! stable slug that `mcp_catalog.oauth_provider` references. A single provider row
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//! covers every service that provider exposes (Gmail, Calendar, Drive) — the
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//! client credentials live here, the per-connector scopes in the catalog.
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//!
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//! `client_secret` is a household/global secret the admin owns (§4/§15b), so it is
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//! fine in the admin-readable file. Per-user refresh tokens never land here.
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use anyhow::Result;
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use serde::Serialize;
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use sqlx::SqlitePool;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, sqlx::FromRow)]
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pub struct OauthProviderRow {
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pub name: String,
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pub display_name: String,
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pub auth_url: String,
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pub token_url: String,
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pub client_id: String,
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/// Never leaves the process for the browser — see [`OauthProviderView`].
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pub client_secret: String,
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pub redirect_uri: String,
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pub extra_params: Option<String>,
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pub created_at: String,
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pub updated_at: String,
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}
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impl OauthProviderRow {
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/// Extra authorization-endpoint params (e.g. `access_type=offline`,
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/// `prompt=consent`) merged into the consent URL. Google needs both to return a
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/// refresh token; a provider that needs neither leaves this NULL.
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pub fn extra(&self) -> HashMap<String, String> {
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self.extra_params.as_deref()
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.and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str(s).ok())
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.unwrap_or_default()
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}
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}
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/// The provider as the admin UI renders it — **without** `client_secret`. The list
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/// endpoint reaches the browser, and the secret has no business there.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
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pub struct OauthProviderView {
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pub name: String,
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pub display_name: String,
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pub auth_url: String,
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pub token_url: String,
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pub client_id: String,
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pub redirect_uri: String,
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pub extra_params: Option<String>,
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/// So the admin sees a secret is set without the value crossing the wire.
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pub has_client_secret: bool,
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}
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impl From<OauthProviderRow> for OauthProviderView {
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fn from(r: OauthProviderRow) -> Self {
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OauthProviderView {
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has_client_secret: !r.client_secret.is_empty(),
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name: r.name,
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display_name: r.display_name,
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auth_url: r.auth_url,
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token_url: r.token_url,
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client_id: r.client_id,
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redirect_uri: r.redirect_uri,
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extra_params: r.extra_params,
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}
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}
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}
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const SELECT: &str =
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"SELECT name, display_name, auth_url, token_url, client_id, client_secret, \
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redirect_uri, extra_params, created_at, updated_at \
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FROM oauth_providers";
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// ── Reads ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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pub async fn list(pool: &SqlitePool) -> Result<Vec<OauthProviderRow>> {
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let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, OauthProviderRow>(sqlx::AssertSqlSafe(format!("{SELECT} ORDER BY name")))
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.fetch_all(pool)
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.await?;
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Ok(rows)
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}
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pub async fn get(pool: &SqlitePool, name: &str) -> Result<Option<OauthProviderRow>> {
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let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, OauthProviderRow>(sqlx::AssertSqlSafe(format!("{SELECT} WHERE name = ?")))
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.bind(name)
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.fetch_optional(pool)
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.await?;
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Ok(row)
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}
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// ── Writes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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pub struct UpsertProvider<'a> {
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pub name: &'a str,
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pub display_name: &'a str,
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pub auth_url: &'a str,
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pub token_url: &'a str,
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pub client_id: &'a str,
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pub client_secret: &'a str,
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pub redirect_uri: &'a str,
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pub extra_params: Option<&'a str>,
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}
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pub async fn upsert(pool: &SqlitePool, p: UpsertProvider<'_>) -> Result<()> {
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sqlx::query(
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"INSERT INTO oauth_providers
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(name, display_name, auth_url, token_url, client_id, client_secret, redirect_uri, extra_params)
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VALUES (?1, ?2, ?3, ?4, ?5, ?6, ?7, ?8)
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ON CONFLICT(name) DO UPDATE SET
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display_name = excluded.display_name,
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auth_url = excluded.auth_url,
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token_url = excluded.token_url,
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client_id = excluded.client_id,
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-- Keep the stored secret when the form submits an empty one: the admin
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-- editing a provider's URLs should not have to re-paste the secret,
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-- which the list view never gave back to the browser.
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client_secret = CASE WHEN excluded.client_secret = ''
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THEN oauth_providers.client_secret
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ELSE excluded.client_secret END,
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redirect_uri = excluded.redirect_uri,
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extra_params = excluded.extra_params,
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updated_at = datetime('now')",
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)
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.bind(p.name)
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.bind(p.display_name)
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.bind(p.auth_url)
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.bind(p.token_url)
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.bind(p.client_id)
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.bind(p.client_secret)
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.bind(p.redirect_uri)
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.bind(p.extra_params)
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.execute(pool)
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.await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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pub async fn delete(pool: &SqlitePool, name: &str) -> Result<()> {
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sqlx::query("DELETE FROM oauth_providers WHERE name = ?")
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.bind(name)
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.execute(pool)
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.await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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