The agent had no way to know its container ships ffmpeg, ripgrep or
tesseract, so it either declined work it could do or spent a round finding
out. This adds a command list to the system prompt as a **discovery hint** —
explicitly not an inventory.
Every decision follows from it being a hint:
- The allowlist (~35 entries, `container/commands.rs`) is the curation; a
full PATH dump is 800 entries of coreutils noise. The probe exists so the
list cannot *lie*, not so it can discover: `command -v` at login means we
never announce something a container recreate threw away.
- The rendered prose says the list is partial and names `command -v`, so a
tool outside the allowlist costs one check rather than a wrong conclusion.
An empty probe renders as an explicit "could not be read", never as
silence under a heading promising a list.
- Order is the allowlist's own, grouped by kind of work — the grouping is
the curation, and the reader is a model, not a grep.
- Staleness is cheap both ways, so there is no invalidation machinery: a
login-time snapshot on `UserContext`, non-fatal, refreshed at next login.
The gate is the tool, not the sentinel. Every AGENT.md carries
`common/sandbox.md` — the four system agents included — and the section is
emitted iff the turn's model is shown `execute_cmd`, derived from
`allow_tools` plus the security group's visibility filter for a root turn
and from `child_defs` for a sub-agent: always the same definitions the model
will see. `has_execute_cmd` therefore joins the PrefixCache key, since the
group is switchable mid-conversation and that switch already rewrites the
tool payload in the same provider cache.
The fragment holds only the heading and one stable sentence; every
conditional claim lives in the renderer, because prose promising
`sudo apt-get install` is not the renderer's to retract when the tool is
absent. `execute_cmd`'s own description loses `(python + node available)`:
its job is steering away from the shell, and a capability advertisement
diluted it.
Per blueprint/skill-project.md: the old single-namespace, hand-maintained
index is gone, replaced by a read-only, two-scope tree whose index is a
runtime function of its content.
- skills/ index generated at runtime (crates/skald-core/src/skills/:
inventory, install, validate, watch), injected through the new
<!-- SKILLS_LIST --> placeholder in AGENT.md (agents/common/skills.md);
meta.json inject_skills flag removed. 11 chat/task agents carry the
include, the 4 system agents do not.
- Two trees, both read-only in both directions: skills/shared/{id} (the
group's) and skills/{username}/{id} (one member's own, on the stable
userid). The root is closed too: UserFs::SkillMounts + RouteError (alias
probe, plain-denied paths, no home fallback) and a per-user
.skills-root/{userid} container mount with the two scope mounts nested
inside, plus the fifth self-heal axis (skills_mounted).
- Agent verbs: skill_register/skill_delete (Config group, global scope
behind the new skill.manage capability), fetch_repo for public repos,
list_items(type="skills"); reads are plain read_file on the printed
path. Seeded @fs_read skills/* allow.
- Freshness: a digest-gated watcher on the two trees emits
SystemEvent::SkillsChanged, whose subscriber rebuilds the frozen prompt
prefix via Skald::invalidate_prompt_prefix; in-process writers invalidate
directly.
- The build ships no skills: the three bundled skills (ics2json,
mcp-builder, skill-creator) and skills/index.md are removed, skills/ is
instance data (gitignored, not packaged, no longer pruned by update.sh).
- Docs: skills.md, agents.md, shared-folders.md added; docs/index.md and
agents/README.md updated.
Both metas declared "strength": "medium", which is not an LlmStrength
(very_low | low | average | high | very_high). `discover()` warns and skips a
meta.json it cannot deserialize — deliberately, so one bad file does not blank
the whole roster — so the two agents never reached /api/agents and the page's
"system" section only ever showed event-triage.
The skip is right; its silence is not. `agents::tests::every_shipped_agent_meta_parses`
deserializes every shipped meta.json, so a typo'd field now fails the build
instead of quietly costing an agent its place in the UI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Memory is kept as a maintained wiki, and a wiki nobody prunes rots. This adds
the scheduled maintenance pass, and generalises the machinery TIC had grown so
that a background agent is a trait impl rather than a loop of its own.
Two lint agents, not one. The private pass runs per user over `user-memory/`
and reports to them; the shared pass runs once over `shared-memory/`, where the
interesting defect is different — a note failing the table rule, i.e. private
business written where every member can read it. It names the note and the
category without repeating the content, since restating it spreads the very
thing being flagged. Both share `agents/common/memory-lint.md`.
Both are read-only, and that is enforced twice: the prompt says report-never-
repair, and `shared-memory/*` writes are already `@fs_write require`, so an
agent that tried to fix something would raise an approval card from an
unattended pass, which is auto-denied. Read-only is the only design that works
here, not merely the safe one.
One scheduler for cadences three orders of magnitude apart. TIC runs every few
minutes, a lint weekly — the case that tempts a second loop. It stays one
because the wake-up decides nothing: `base_tick` picks only how often to look,
and whether an agent runs for a user is `is_due` against persisted state.
Due-ness moves out of the run log into a new owner table, `system_agent_state`.
The two answer different questions: the run log skips idle ticks so it stays a
history rather than a heartbeat, while scheduling needs every attempt. Reading
due-ness off the log would re-run an idle agent on every tick and never bring a
weekly one due once its last productive run aged out. Persisting it is also
what makes a long interval survive a restart — an in-memory deadline is fine at
TIC's scale, but a weekly agent on a box rebooted every few days would have it
re-armed before it ever fired.
The shared store belongs to nobody, so `AgentScope::Instance` runs that pass as
the first unlocked admin. An ownerless run would write its trace into system.db,
which the runs endpoint shows to nobody by design, and its notify() would have
no recipient; attributing it to a user keeps the whole per-user surface working
unchanged.
Settings move to where the run log is. `ConfigSet` gains `owner`, so placement
is data on the set rather than a page that knows set names; the System agents
page grows one tab per agent holding its description, its settings (admin only)
and its runs — "why did this do nothing last night?" is half a schedule
question and half a log question. The form is shared with the Config page, and
writes still go through PUT /api/config/{key}.
Fixes an authorization gap found on the way: neither /api/config handler took
the caller into account, so any authenticated session could read and write
instance-wide config. The sidebar hiding the page is presentation, not access
control. Both are now admin-gated.
Daniele
dguiducciandClaude Opus 5