Commit Graph
36 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniele 1b709a880f feat(agents): learn and reuse the user's writing style
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 9s
The chat agents now treat a stated preference about how something should be
written — or a correction to a draft they produced — as durable, and record it
in a `## Writing style` section of `user-memory/user.md`: preferred wording,
how emails open and close, what changes between the formal and the informal
register, and contacts written to differently from everyone else.

The section is capped at 10 lines, because it shares `user.md`'s own 40-line
budget and per-recipient detail is the half that grows without bound; past
that, the whole section moves into its own note and leaves a pointer behind.
A rule that turns out to be wrong is corrected in place rather than joined by
a second bullet contradicting it.

Shipped as the shared fragment `common/writing-style.md`, included by the
three `type: chat` agents. Only `assistant` injects `user.md` automatically,
so the fragment closes by telling the other two to read it before drafting.
2026-08-19 11:03:42 +01:00
Daniele 0042f3dbcb fix(image-generate): save generated images into the caller's workspace
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 5m42s
image_generate wrote the file into the server's own data/images/ and handed
that host path to the model. It is a path in nobody's vocabulary: not the
caller's home, not their container. Telegram's send_attachment therefore
resolved it under the user's home and answered "file not found", and
read_file, execute_cmd and the viewer could not reach it either. The web URL
was the only surface that worked, which is why the failure only ever showed
on Telegram -- and why the model there, having no working way to hand the
file over, started inventing send_photo and send_media.

Placement moves to the tool, the one place holding a ToolContext:

- The manager returns bytes (generate_bytes) and no longer knows where an
  image goes. It has no UserFs and no session, so it never could have.

- run_with saves through uploads::save_to_home into uploads/{session}/. The
  returned path is agent vocabulary, so every consumer resolves it, and that
  is the one directory the media inliner is authorized to read from -- a
  vision model can be shown the image it just made. execute_async, the
  context-free path, now fails loudly rather than writing somewhere nobody
  can read; same shape as execute_cmd.

- The extension is sniffed rather than assumed png: it is what decides
  whether Telegram sends the picture inline or as an anonymous document, and
  providers return jpeg and webp too. The file is named after the prompt, so
  it reads as something in the explorer and in Telegram.

The result still carries a url, since the chat renders Markdown images and
![](url) beats naming a file the user then has to open. It points at
/api/file?path=..., which resolves through the caller's own UserFs. The old
/api/images/{id} route is removed: it had no writer left once placement
moved, and it addressed one instance-wide directory behind require_auth
alone, with no notion of who owned the image -- the same shape as the /data
static mount removed before it. That leaves data_root unused, so the manager
no longer knows about the server's filesystem at all.

Docs: the Telegram page explains send_attachment as the channel's equivalent
of show_file_to_user; the ComfyUI page says where a generated image lands and
which of the two handles to use where.

Also introduces CHANGELOG.md and the standing rule for it in CLAUDE.md.
2026-08-19 10:29:14 +01:00
Daniele 66d83358d9 feat(event-triage): user notification preferences via user-memory/notifications.md
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 9s
Release / verify-version (pull_request) Successful in 2s
Release / release (pull_request) Skipped
The single-user notifications.md mechanism (a file in data/) died in the
multi-user move: assistant's prompt still pointed at it, but nothing read
it. Replace it with a memory note:

- event-triage injects user-memory/notifications.md verbatim on every
  pass and treats it as authoritative over its default heuristics
- a shared common/notifications.md fragment, included by assistant, kid
  and project-coordinator, tells the chat agents to record preference
  requests there: one dated rule per bullet under a source heading or
  General, asking for the source when ambiguous
- docs/system-agents.md explains the steering to users
2026-08-14 13:21:06 +01:00
Daniele e7c802f0d7 feat(event-triage): per-user check interval, overriding the instance one
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 5m4s
Event triage is the one system agent whose right cadence depends on who it
runs for: it fires on inbound events, so someone on a dozen mailing lists
has something waiting on nearly every tick while a quiet account has
something waiting almost never. A single instance-wide interval serves one
of them badly, and the observed failure is the first: the agent starts on
practically every pass.

An admin can now set a per-person interval on that user's page (Users ->
the person -> Event triage). Empty means "follow the instance setting",
which stays the state nobody has a row for.

- New registry table `system_agent_user_settings(agent_id, user_id,
  interval_secs)`. A row is an override and its absence is inheritance --
  no sentinel value, no row seeded at user creation, clearing the field
  deletes the row. Registry rather than the user's own file because the
  writer is the admin and a member's database is unreadable unless they
  happen to be logged in; a setting that could only be changed during its
  subject's session would not be a setting. Keyed by agent_id though only
  one agent uses it, so a future agent's schedule is not a schema change.

- `SystemAgent` gains `interval_secs_for(user_id)`, which `is_due` now
  measures against, and `shortest_interval_secs()`. Both default to the
  existing `interval_secs`, so every other agent implements nothing. The
  second is the non-obvious half: `base_tick` sleeps for the shortest
  interval any enabled agent asks for, so without it an override below the
  instance value would be rounded up to it -- an override that works when
  it lengthens and silently does nothing when it shortens.

- `GET/PUT /api/users/{id}/event-triage`, admin-gated, minutes on the
  wire, null to clear. Nothing rides the bus: the scheduler re-reads the
  interval every tick and due-ness is counted from the user's own last
  attempt, so a change lands on the next wake-up with no push.

Both helpers fail open onto the instance value -- an unreadable registry
must not turn into an agent that stops running for someone.

Docs: docs/system-agents.md gains the per-person section and no longer
reads as if the interval were one number for everybody.
2026-08-14 13:07:45 +01:00
Daniele 402c9ffe50 feat(file-viewer): syntax highlighting for code files and chat code blocks
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8s
Vendor highlight.js (core + python, javascript, typescript, json, yaml,
bash) and highlight the file viewer's text kind (computed once per load)
plus fenced blocks in renderMarkdown. Colors come from new --syn-* CSS
variables aliased to the existing palette, so dark mode follows.
2026-08-11 10:41:50 +01:00
Daniele 1515492938 feat(file-viewer): browse a versioned file's git history
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8m5s
A clock button in the file viewer header lists the versions of a file
whose project keeps a git history; picking one shows the file as of
that commit, read-only, with a banner back to the current version.

A past version is never served from the working tree: the whole
repository is materialized at that revision (git archive streamed
through tar into a size-bounded, immutable-by-rev cache) and every
fetch — content, compiled LaTeX, markdown images, downloads — resolves
inside that tree, so dependencies are contemporaneous with the file:
a .tex compiles against its \input's and images of that moment.

Backend: new git_versions module (repo discovery bounded by the
workspace mount, host-git log/rev-parse/archive, extraction cache with
oldest-first prune) + GET /api/file/versions and a rev param on
GET /api/file (rev is the ETag; never X-Writable). Frontend: history
mode in FileViewerBase shared by the desktop and mobile viewers —
popover, banner, watcher paused while browsing, rev propagated to
every /api/file URL it builds.
2026-08-10 14:27:48 +01:00
Daniele cd641ab89e feat(project-coordinator): offer to keep a history of a project
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8m21s
A project folder accumulates work with no way to see what changed or undo a
wrong turn. The coordinator now offers to keep one, once, in plain words, and
initializes it only after an explicit yes — the mechanism is git in the sandbox
but the jargon stays out of the conversation, since the person being offered
this is not necessarily someone who knows what a commit is. That first yes is
standing consent to snapshot at later milestones, so the agent does not re-ask
each time.

Recorded in the project's SKALD.md so a future session knows the history exists
rather than proposing it again, and documented in docs/projects.md, which is
what the assistant reads to explain the feature to a user.
2026-08-10 13:20:26 +01:00
Daniele 5980bdb5b9 feat(users): unlock and start unencrypted users at boot
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8m10s
A login is what makes an *encrypted* database readable; for an
unencrypted one it gated nothing but the runtime — the file has no key
and is already readable by this process. The cost was user-visible and
read as a bug: after every restart the Telegram bot answered "your
account is locked, log in via the web app", cron fired nothing and no
background agent ran, until a human opened the SPA.

`Skald::new` now calls `UserManager::unlock_all_unencrypted`, which
registers the pools exactly as a login would and refuses an encrypted or
inactive user. Unlocking alone only makes the data readable, so
`wiring::spawn_unlocked_user_runtimes` then builds a `UserContext` for
each — cron, the notify queue, the hub and the per-user MCP runtime all
hang off it. That build is a background supervisor task rather than part
of `new()`: it starts every member's MCP servers inside their container,
and the HTTP listener must not wait behind it. The same two steps run
per user off the lifecycle bus (`UserCreated`,
`UserActiveChanged{active:true}`, after the container `ensure`), so a
member created at runtime does not wait for the next restart.

Two boundaries stay where they were. Authentication is untouched:
`SessionStore` sits above `UserManager`, so no HTTP request
authenticates as anyone because of this. And the auto-unlock is
deliberately not on a lazy path such as `Skald::user_context` —
`revoke_user_runtime` locks a pool synchronously and expects nothing to
re-open it, so the writers of that map stay boot, login and the bus.

`open_db` and the two unencrypted openers now share `register_unlocked`
and `open_unencrypted_file`; `open_unencrypted` (the supervision path)
still does not register its pool.
2026-08-10 12:16:33 +01:00
Daniele 5765941758 feat(prompt): tell the agent what its sandbox can run
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8m6s
The agent had no way to know its container ships ffmpeg, ripgrep or
tesseract, so it either declined work it could do or spent a round finding
out. This adds a command list to the system prompt as a **discovery hint** —
explicitly not an inventory.

Every decision follows from it being a hint:

- The allowlist (~35 entries, `container/commands.rs`) is the curation; a
  full PATH dump is 800 entries of coreutils noise. The probe exists so the
  list cannot *lie*, not so it can discover: `command -v` at login means we
  never announce something a container recreate threw away.
- The rendered prose says the list is partial and names `command -v`, so a
  tool outside the allowlist costs one check rather than a wrong conclusion.
  An empty probe renders as an explicit "could not be read", never as
  silence under a heading promising a list.
- Order is the allowlist's own, grouped by kind of work — the grouping is
  the curation, and the reader is a model, not a grep.
- Staleness is cheap both ways, so there is no invalidation machinery: a
  login-time snapshot on `UserContext`, non-fatal, refreshed at next login.

The gate is the tool, not the sentinel. Every AGENT.md carries
`common/sandbox.md` — the four system agents included — and the section is
emitted iff the turn's model is shown `execute_cmd`, derived from
`allow_tools` plus the security group's visibility filter for a root turn
and from `child_defs` for a sub-agent: always the same definitions the model
will see. `has_execute_cmd` therefore joins the PrefixCache key, since the
group is switchable mid-conversation and that switch already rewrites the
tool payload in the same provider cache.

The fragment holds only the heading and one stable sentence; every
conditional claim lives in the renderer, because prose promising
`sudo apt-get install` is not the renderer's to retract when the tool is
absent. `execute_cmd`'s own description loses `(python + node available)`:
its job is steering away from the shell, and a capability advertisement
diluted it.
2026-08-09 09:49:50 +01:00
Daniele c27da4e6ab feat(skills): rebuild the skill system for the multi-user model
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8m6s
Per blueprint/skill-project.md: the old single-namespace, hand-maintained
index is gone, replaced by a read-only, two-scope tree whose index is a
runtime function of its content.

- skills/ index generated at runtime (crates/skald-core/src/skills/:
  inventory, install, validate, watch), injected through the new
  <!-- SKILLS_LIST --> placeholder in AGENT.md (agents/common/skills.md);
  meta.json inject_skills flag removed. 11 chat/task agents carry the
  include, the 4 system agents do not.
- Two trees, both read-only in both directions: skills/shared/{id} (the
  group's) and skills/{username}/{id} (one member's own, on the stable
  userid). The root is closed too: UserFs::SkillMounts + RouteError (alias
  probe, plain-denied paths, no home fallback) and a per-user
  .skills-root/{userid} container mount with the two scope mounts nested
  inside, plus the fifth self-heal axis (skills_mounted).
- Agent verbs: skill_register/skill_delete (Config group, global scope
  behind the new skill.manage capability), fetch_repo for public repos,
  list_items(type="skills"); reads are plain read_file on the printed
  path. Seeded @fs_read skills/* allow.
- Freshness: a digest-gated watcher on the two trees emits
  SystemEvent::SkillsChanged, whose subscriber rebuilds the frozen prompt
  prefix via Skald::invalidate_prompt_prefix; in-process writers invalidate
  directly.
- The build ships no skills: the three bundled skills (ics2json,
  mcp-builder, skill-creator) and skills/index.md are removed, skills/ is
  instance data (gitignored, not packaged, no longer pruned by update.sh).
- Docs: skills.md, agents.md, shared-folders.md added; docs/index.md and
  agents/README.md updated.
2026-08-08 23:05:35 +01:00
Daniele 71e1a26b08 fix(ui): render PDFs with pdf.js instead of an iframe
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m59s
On iOS the file viewer showed only the first page of a PDF, with no way
to scroll to the rest — the document had to be downloaded and opened in
another app. The cause was not ours: WebKit refuses to mount its PDF
viewer inside an <iframe>/<object>/<embed> and paints a static first-page
thumbnail instead. That hits Safari on iOS and every WKWebView, so the
native shell too. The full viewer only exists for a top-level navigation.

The desktop browsers do mount a viewer, but each mounts its own — Chrome's
toolbar, Safari's page-index sidebar — so the same document also looked
different on every machine.

Both are answered by drawing the pages ourselves. New <pdf-view>
(web/components/shared/pdf-view.js) renders a continuous scroll of canvas
pages on the vendored pdf.js, with a zoom control and a page counter, and
replaces the iframe for both native .pdf files and server-compiled LaTeX.

Three properties are load-bearing:

- pdf.js is imported lazily (~450 KB + a 1.2 MB worker), so a session that
  never opens a PDF never pays for it.
- Canvases are created and destroyed as pages scroll. iOS caps the total
  canvas backing store a page may hold and silently blanks canvases past
  it, so an eager render would come out empty on exactly the platform this
  was written for. Off-screen pages keep only a correctly-sized box, which
  is also what keeps the scrollbar honest.
- The text layer (selection, in-page find) is best-effort: it is
  transparent DOM over the pixels, so its failures are swallowed rather
  than surfaced.

Vendored from pdfjs-dist 6.2.108: pdf.min.mjs, pdf.worker.min.mjs, the
standard-font data (needed by PDFs that reference Helvetica/Times without
embedding them) and the .textLayer block of pdf_viewer.css. CJK cmaps are
deliberately left out. pdf.js 6 needs Safari/iOS 17.4+.

Verified in headless Chromium against both a synthetic 12-page PDF using
non-embedded Helvetica and a real 14-page paper with embedded fonts and
figures: all pages present, last page renders after scrolling, page 1
released off-screen, text layer populated, zoom re-renders at the new
scale, no JS errors.
2026-08-08 17:16:15 +01:00
dguiducci 8013022321 feat(files): streaming ZIP download in the project explorer
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 8m52s
Each row of the project Files tab gains a download action, and the toolbar
gains a Download ZIP button scoped to the folder being browsed (at the root,
the whole project). Visible to read-only members too: download is a read.

Single files need no new backend: they reuse GET /api/file?force_download.
Directories go through the new GET /api/file/download, which builds the ZIP
on the fly: an async task walks the tree and async_zip (Astral's maintained
rs-async-zip fork) streams entries into a bounded duplex stream backing the
response body — no temp file, no whole-archive buffer, backpressure for free,
and the task dies with the client. Compression is per entry: Deflate at
maximum level, except files whose magic bytes name an already-compressed
format (media/PDF via the shared sniffer, the ZIP family, gzip/zstd/7z/rar,
compressed audio), which are Stored. Entries are prefixed with the folder
name, empty folders and unix permission bits survive, symlinks are never
followed into the archive, and containment stays fail-closed under the
resolved root. Covered by a round-trip test read back with the crate's own
reader (and verified against unzip/python's zipfile).
2026-08-07 19:49:30 +01:00
dguiducci d3fd9bd3af feat(ui): collapsible icon-only sidebar on desktop
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m53s
A double-chevron button in the sidebar's brand row shrinks the menu to a
strip of icons, freeing workspace for documents. Icons stay clickable with
tooltips; section headers, the Task Manager submenu and the recent-projects
list disappear while collapsed; the inbox count survives as a badge on the
icon. Collapsible sections (Config, Dev) ignore their closed state while
minimized so their entries stay reachable. Persisted in localStorage.
2026-08-07 16:37:55 +01:00
dguiducci 78cdcf4cc7 feat: let one source carry several chats, and open them with a +
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m49s
A source had exactly one live conversation, so the copilot could only ever
replace a chat, never add one: the trash button reset the source and the old
conversation was left orphaned. Working on two things at once meant losing one.

The tab bar now holds two kinds of tab. A primary tab is a source — it shows
whatever `web` or `project-7` currently points at, which is where background
delivery lands (notify, a finished async task, an inbound Telegram message) and
what a reset moves to a fresh row. A secondary tab, opened with `+`, is one
specific conversation: its source points elsewhere, so it is unreachable by
source name and is addressed by id throughout — REST, WebSocket, event
filtering. `POST /api/sessions/new` creates one without touching `sources`,
which is the whole difference from a reset; its agent and run-context still come
from the source, so an extra project tab is the coordinator with the project's
context. Project "Open chat" is untouched and still resumes the project's own.

The load-bearing half is in ChatHub: the input queue and the model pin are now
keyed by session, not by source. Two tabs on one source would otherwise
serialize into a single queue and a single turn, and share a `/model` pin — the
odd one out, since the security group was already per-session and persisted. The
source-taking methods survive as one-line resolvers, so Telegram, mobile and
cron are untouched. Because queues now grow with conversations rather than with
the handful of sources, a reset retires the queue it replaces instead of leaving
a consumer task parked forever.

Events are filtered per conversation, so anything a chat must see has to carry a
session id: `show_file_to_user`'s OpenFile and the security-group revalidation
were emitting untagged and would have reached nobody. A primary connection
additionally follows NewSession for its source, so a second window does not keep
talking to a conversation another window just reset.

Tabs can be renamed by double-click — `chat_sessions.title` existed and was dead
until now. An empty name stores NULL, so the box is also the undo.
2026-08-04 22:15:20 +01:00
dguiducci 8f5c5382c8 feat: keep the chat tabs you left open, and keep them with you
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m39s
Reopening the app closed every project tab: the copilot's tab bar lived in
RAM, so a reload dropped it and each conversation had to be found again from
its project board.

The set of open tabs is now a column on the session row, `chat_sessions.is_open`
(additive, `ensure_column`), restored by `GET /api/sessions/open` and written by
`PUT /api/sessions/{id}/open`. Not localStorage: that store is per-origin, so on
a shared laptop one member's tabs would greet the next, whereas the owner table
sits in their own encrypted file and follows them to another device. Which tab
is *selected* stays in sessionStorage — that one is genuinely per window, and a
shared value would have two windows fighting over it.

`is_open` defaults to 0 and `chat_sessions::create` never sets it: every `/new`
leaves its predecessor behind and every system-agent pass mints a row, so the
opposite default would restore a bar full of conversations nobody opened. Only
the copilot writes the column, at the moment it opens the tab. A reset moves the
flag rather than copying it — `POST /api/sessions` now returns the new id and
`new_session` carries it, and the old row is closed as the new one opens, or the
source would restore twice and a later close would clear the stale row.

Closing a tab clears the flag and nothing else: the conversation is kept and
comes back with its history when the project is reopened.
2026-08-04 21:50:10 +01:00
dguiducci 01b8a187b5 feat: let a background task ask the chat that started it, not just the Inbox
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m42s
An async sub-agent runs in a session of its own, so the rich per-session events
that draw the inline approval card never reach the chat's socket — only the
id-only inbox lifecycle ones do. A task blocked on an approval was therefore
invisible in the conversation that started it, and the only way to unblock it
was to notice the sidebar badge and go to the Inbox.

The chat already shows what it handed off. This asks the same question of the
pending items: `GET /{source}/inbox` joins them against the sessions of this
conversation's running async jobs, so "whose is this" has one answer, in the
same place `/{source}/tasks` answers it for a task. The client is left with a
list to render, not a correlation to guess. The live path adds no event — the
existing `approval_requested` / `clarification_*` broadcasts already reach every
socket of the user, and re-reading the endpoint turns a nudge into something
renderable and survives a reload for free.

The card sits above the task strip rather than in the transcript: the task that
is asking may have been started twenty messages ago, and a card that scrolls
away is a card that gets missed. One at a time, with a count of what is behind
it — a blocked task stays blocked whether or not its card is on screen, so
stacking them would trade a readable chat for a queue nobody asked to see. And
it closes: the ✕ hides the card without resolving anything, leaving the item in
the Inbox, because a panel that cannot be moved takes the chat hostage.

`InboxCardsMixin` is the cards and their resolve calls, split out of
`InboxMixin` so the chat and the Inbox render the same approval rather than two
drifting copies of it; `_afterInboxResolve` is the only thing they disagree on.

Elicitations are left out: `PendingElicitationInfo` carries no `session_id`, so
there is nothing to attribute one to a task with.

Also: an async task's context label said "CronJob:", which sends whoever reads
the approval looking on the wrong page — and now says so next to the task's
real name.
2026-08-04 21:00:45 +01:00
dguiducci efb5b1dc33 feat: let an agent ask what its connectors are, instead of guessing
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m44s
An agent that wanted to know which MCP servers it had called
`list_mcp_servers` — a tool that has never existed anywhere in this
repo — and got "unknown tool". It was not a random hallucination: the
prompt block says "the system prompt shows available servers", and
`render_mcp_list` returned an empty string when nothing was connected.
The model read a promise, found no table, and invented the discovery
tool the text implied. The `mcp` kinds of `list_items`/`toggle_item`
had been removed to close the §14 RCE vector, which was right for the
write half and left no read half at all.

So `list_items` gains `type: "mcp"` and returns the whole picture in
one call, split into four buckets that each answer a different
question: what is already loaded (call its tools directly), what is
ready for `activate_tools`, what is installed but unusable and why,
and what the user could still activate. Conflating the first two is
what produced the original failure, so they stay apart. Every entry
carries a derived note and a next step; when the step is a human one,
it says so and names the UI page, because there is no tool for it.

Read-only, and structurally so: `toggle_item` deliberately gains
nothing, and the new `McpDirectory` trait exposes exactly one method.
Enabling a connector from a tool is the thing §14 removed, and a wider
seam here is how it would come back. Deny-by-default survives the
report — an ungranted connector is not named at all, since a listing
of what to ask for is itself a leak — except for a catalogue manager,
who cannot administer what they cannot see.

Three sources answer three questions and none is redundant: the
registry says what exists and who may have it, the owner database says
what was activated, and the live runtimes say what is connected right
now — a row can read `ready` while its process is dead. The live half
reaches the tool through the turn's extension map, alongside the pool
and the fs view; with no live view the durable picture still renders,
so freshness is an improvement and never a precondition.

The static `__MCP_LIST__` table stays as it was, because it is frozen
per conversation for prompt-cache stability. Its empty case now says
so out loud and points at the tool.
2026-08-04 19:41:18 +01:00
dguiducci daaceff6ba feat: show a conversation its own background tasks, and give it back every outcome
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m34s
An `execute_task mode="async"` was invisible from the chat that started it.
The only trace was the receipt in the transcript and a row on the Tasks page
— which does not say *which* of those rows the assistant just spawned — so
"is it still going?" had no answer where the question is asked.

Worse, a task that did not simply succeed never came back at all. `run_job`
branched on `Ok`/`Err` first and routed by `job.kind` only inside the `Ok`
arm, so a failure or a kill left through the `Err` arm's unconditional
`hub.notify` — the home source (`/sethome`), worded "Cron job … failed" —
while the parent conversation sat waiting for a `task_completed` that would
never arrive. The wrong chat, and a wedged one.

The fix is a shape, not a branch: one `JobOutcome` classification, then one
`match job.kind` delivery site for every ending. An async task now ends in
its parent conversation whatever happened to it. The sink has a single
channel deliberately — to the model reading it, "it broke" is a result like
any other and must not be overlookable — so a failure is delivered as prose,
carrying whatever partial output the run produced, which is usually the only
clue about why. A cron job keeps the home notification: it belongs to nobody's
conversation. Cancellation becomes a third outcome rather than a flavour of
failure (`job_runs.status` has always had `'cancelled'` in its CHECK and
nothing ever wrote it), classified off the new typed `TurnCancelled` error so
nothing keys on a message string.

The strip above the composer is the visible half. `ServerEvent::TaskUpdate`
announces state to the source of the parent conversation only; the list is
`renderTaskStrip` (shared by the desktop copilot and the mobile chat), fed by
state on `ChatSession`. Each row links to `#session/{id}` — the page that
already shows, live, what a background agent is doing, and without which
"a task is running" is a fact you can do nothing with. Stopping is the
existing kill endpoint. A finished row clears itself after 20 s (its result
is in the conversation by then); a failed one stays until dismissed, and the
dismissal is remembered across reloads.

`GET /api/{source}/tasks` is what makes the strip survive a browser refresh:
the event is a broadcast with no replay, so without a load-time read a reload
would empty a chat that still has work running under it. It answers with the
running tasks plus failures from the last 30 minutes — the two states a person
can still act on. Successes are absent on purpose. Its window compares through
`datetime()` on both sides: `completed_at` is RFC 3339 and the cutoff is
SQLite-shaped, and `'T' > ' '` would let every same-day row through a window
meant to exclude it.

Not addressed, and worth doing next: a cron job's result should go where its
creator says, not always to the home chat.
2026-08-04 19:13:30 +01:00
dguiducci e29dc40202 fix: say why the microphone is unavailable, instead of freezing the button
`navigator.mediaDevices` only exists in a secure context — HTTPS, or
localhost. Over plain http on a LAN address the property is undefined, so
`_startRecording` threw on its first line, the catch wrote one console line
and returned, and `_recording` stayed false: the button sat there unchanged
with nothing to read anywhere a user would look.

The unavailable cases are now named before the attempt rather than guessed
at afterwards — insecure context, unsupported browser, denied permission,
anything else — and surfaced in the chat through `_pushError`, which every
chat surface already shares. The button is deliberately still rendered when
the context is insecure: hiding it would read as "transcription is not
configured", which is the wrong diagnosis to hand someone.

Adds docs/voice.md, since "why doesn't the microphone work" is a question
the assistant will be asked and the answer is entirely outside Skald.
2026-08-04 15:19:50 +01:00
dguiducci 85536755ee feat: a "Run now" button for the memory lints — one pass, for whoever asked
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m33s
The two memory lints run weekly, which is right for maintenance and wrong for
the moment somebody has just reorganised their notes and wants to know what the
lint makes of them. Each agent's tab now carries a button that starts one pass
immediately, for the caller.

It runs as the caller — their pool, their sessions, their hub — so the report
lands with the person who asked. The shared lint is the interesting case: its
scheduled pass runs as the admin because the shared store belongs to nobody, but
a member pressing the button reads the same store and gets the report themselves,
which is coherent with shared memory being readable by every member anyway.

Two settings are treated differently on purpose. Due-ness is skipped, exactly as
manual /compact skips the compactor's token threshold: the interval answers
*when*, and a human asking is a good enough answer to that. The Enabled switch
is honoured: it answers *whether*, and that one is the admin's.

The conversation review gets no button (AgentScope::PerSubject): it is about
somebody else and picks its own subjects, so "run it for me" has no meaning.
The frontend reads that from the agent's scope, not from a list of ids.

A second starter breaks an invariant the scheduler used to hold for free.
system_agent_runs::start sweeps any leftover `running` row of the same agent to
`failed` before inserting, which was safe only because one sequential loop was
the only thing that ever started a pass; a manual run overlapping a scheduled
one would have marked a healthy run as interrupted and duplicated its work. So
the agent list moves out of the scheduler and onto Skald as SystemAgents, which
holds the registry plus an in-flight guard both paths claim through — keyed on
what the pass is *about*, so an instance-wide agent is one slot no matter who
runs it, and a per-subject review is keyed on the subject rather than on the
supervisor lending the runtime.

has_work is answered synchronously, before anything is spawned: it leaves no run
row, so without that the button would say "started" over a log that never gains
a row. Everything after it is spawned — a pass is an LLM turn, and no HTTP
request should be held open for one. The run row exists before the browser is
answered, so the log itself is the progress surface; the page polls it quietly
until the pass leaves `running`.
2026-08-02 21:40:21 +01:00
dguiducci baf68878e4 fix: stop shrinking conversations behind the user's back — both automatic context guards ship off
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m35s
The shipped default combined a sliding history window with no compaction, which
is the worse of the two available trades in both directions it is measured on.

`max_history_messages: 30` is a sliding tail window (`projection::window` —
`drain(..len - max)`). Past 30 messages it drops from the head on *every* turn,
so the prompt prefix changes on every single request and every provider that
caches one (Anthropic breakpoints, OpenAI automatic prefix caching) misses every
time. It also drops those messages with no summary standing in for them: silent
amnesia, not just a cold cache. Compaction rewrites the prefix once per
compaction and leaves a summary behind — yet it was the half that was commented
out, while the window's own doc-comment already said the two were exclusive.

Both are now `Option` and both ship unset, so nothing shrinks a conversation
unless a human types `/compact`.

Which surfaced the real bug: `/compact` did not work either. The compactor was
`Option<Arc<ContextCompactor>>` keyed on the config section existing, so
commenting out `compaction:` disabled the manual command too — `force_compact`
returned `Ok(false)` and the chat answered "compaction disabled". Manual
compaction is a command a user types; it cannot depend on an admin having filled
in a token threshold. The compactor is now built unconditionally and
`threshold_tokens: Option<u32>` arms only the automatic pass; `try_compact`
early-returns without it, `force_compact` deliberately never consults it.

The projection accordingly yields to the *automatic* pass rather than to the
compactor's existence (`LoopConfig.auto_compaction_enabled`), so a configured
message cap is not silently voided by `/compact` merely being available.
`CompactionConfig::Default` is hand-written for the same reason `RoleAttrs`'s is:
a derived one gives `keep_recent: 0`, which would compact away every recent
message on any box omitting the section — now the default.

Also fixes two documentation bugs in the same file: `event_triage` was documented
nested under `llm:`, where it parses fine and is then silently ignored (it is a
top-level field), and `datetime` was documented twice with conflicting examples.

A new test asserts the shipped default actually deserializes and that both guards
are off — a field the default omits must be genuinely optional, or a brand-new
install fails to boot.

Automatic compaction returns later, triggered off the resolved model's own
context window instead of a hand-tuned token count that cannot know which model
is answering.
2026-08-02 21:21:14 +01:00
dguiducci 4f10528368 feat: conversation review — a nightly report on a supervised person's conversations
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m40s
The first AgentScope::PerSubject system agent, and the reason that scope
exists. Once a night, for each person with a supervision edge, it reads every
message that person and the assistant exchanged since the previous review —
across all their conversations — and writes one report for the people who
supervise them.

Schema (all registry except reports):
- supervision(subject_user_id, supervisor_user_id): the generic §0.1 edge,
  answering both 'whom does a background agent look at' and 'who may read
  what it produced', with real FKs so deleting a user cascades both ways
- system_agent_coverage(agent_id, subject_user_id, covered_through): the
  per-subject watermark that makes 'everything since last time' a window —
  neither system_agent_runs (history for humans) nor system_agent_state
  (advances before the work), and advanced only on a completed pass so a
  crash re-covers instead of skipping
- reports (owner schema, the second two-homes table after memory_docs):
  instance rows land in system.db, deliberately cleartext to the box owner,
  who is the intended reader (§2); the subject cannot see them structurally

The pass reads the subject's database inside a supervisor's runtime, so the
ephemeral session and run row land in the watcher's file; iteration is over
subjects, so two parents watching one child get one review; and the subject
need not be logged in when their space is unencrypted — via the new
UserManager::open_unencrypted, which refuses an encrypted user outright (no
key to be had) and never registers the pool as unlocked.

The agent declares the new AgentMeta flag allow_tools: false, so its turn
gets an empty tool registry — nothing for a prompt injection in the
transcript to call — and produces its report as its final assistant message,
read back from chat_history and parsed (NOTHING_TO_REPORT sentinel, no row on
quiet days). chat_history::conversation_window is the transcript query; its
four filters (non-ephemeral, depth 0, non-synthetic, non-empty) each guard a
specific way the review would otherwise be wrong, and tool calls are absent
by construction.

Cadence is Run at (hour) rather than Interval — 4am local by default — with
due-ness answered inside has_work against the coverage watermark, so a
machine off for three days covers the whole stretch in one pass. Reports
announce ReportCreated on the system bus (no subscriber yet). run_ephemeral_turn
gains a per-pass system_substitutions map, which the review uses to hand the
model the subject's profile under __SUBJECT_PROFILE__ — the system-context
substitutions describe the session owner, the wrong person here.

docs/system-agents.md gains the conversation review section; CLAUDE.md
documents the scope, the tables and the tool-less design.
2026-08-02 20:30:27 +01:00
dguiducci e6818408cb feat: grant a new plugin or connector to everyone by default — the admin's job is now removal, not distribution
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m23s
The grant junctions (plugin_access, mcp_global_access, mcp_catalog_access)
stay deny-by-default internally, but the rows are written for you at two
moments and never again:

  — an object is CREATED: PluginManager::update_config (first toggle —
    the plugins row's birth), mcp::catalog_upsert, marketplace install,
    mcp::global_enable
  — a user is CREATED: UserManager::register_user

Who is included is the role attrs.auto_grant flag (default true, so every
role predating the attribute behaves like an adult member). The seeded
Children preset sets it to false, which is the whole reason the attribute
exists. Admins are skipped because they hold everything implicitly. The
role editor now exposes the switch as a checkbox.

New crate module: db::access_defaults (seed_new_object, seed_new_user,
set_grant_by_default). Additive columns: grant_by_default on plugins,
mcp_catalog, mcp_global_servers (INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1).

On the frontend the Roles page gets a "New extensions" column and
checklist; the user's plugin/connector rosters are unchanged. i18n:
en, fr, it.

Docs: new docs/access.md for the assistant, plus index.md cross-link.
CLAUDE.md updated with a full default-access section.
2026-07-29 15:53:51 +01:00
dguiducci da8a835d70 move per-user plugin grants to the user's page
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m16s
Granting was a checklist of every user on each plugin's page, so "what may
this person use?" meant opening every plugin in turn — and the answer lived
on N pages while the connector half of it already lived on one. Both grant
sections now sit together on #users/{id}: same row list, same disabled chip,
same replace-the-whole-set save. The plugin's own page keeps a read-only
roster of who holds it, linking back to each person.

- db: plugin_access::set_for_user, the per-user twin of set_for_user on
  mcp_catalog_access; set_access stays as the inverse read model
- PluginManager: list_grants_for_user / set_grants_for_user, which omit and
  reject manages_own_access plugins (a box that controls nothing is worse
  than no box)
- GET/PUT /api/users/{id}/plugins, mounted next to /users/{id}/connectors;
  PUT /api/plugins/{id}/access is gone, GET remains as the roster

No push after the write, unlike a connector grant: that one gates a runtime
snapshotted at login, while a plugin grant is re-read from plugin_access on
every request that depends on it (sidebar pages, /plugins/mine, and each
inbound channel message), so a revoke lands with no bus event.

Docs updated with where access is granted, and why mobile-connector is
absent from that list.
2026-07-29 11:36:47 +01:00
dguiducci 046f060fcd rename the TIC system agent to event triage
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m16s
TIC said nothing about what the agent does, and named the wrong thing: the
tick belongs to the scheduler, which is generic and lives outside it. The
agent's only decision is whether an incoming event deserves an interruption
— it sorts, it never acts — so it is now event-triage, matching the
functional naming of the two memory lints.

- agents/tic/ -> agents/event-triage/, module tic/ -> event_triage/,
  TicManager -> EventTriageManager, TicConfig -> EventTriageConfig
- agent id and chat source: "tic" -> "event-triage"
- config keys: tic.* -> event_triage.*, and the config.yml section tic: ->
  event_triage: (greenfield: previously set values fall back to defaults)
- i18n en/it/fr: Event triage / Triage eventi / Tri des evenements; dropped
  the stale "TIC sessions" mention from the debug-pages description
- docs/system-agents.md, docs/index.md, docs/settings.md, CLAUDE.md, SKALD.md
2026-07-28 21:59:37 +01:00
dguiducci 434e27d7c2 system agents: generalise the scheduler and add the two memory lints
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m14s
Memory is kept as a maintained wiki, and a wiki nobody prunes rots. This adds
the scheduled maintenance pass, and generalises the machinery TIC had grown so
that a background agent is a trait impl rather than a loop of its own.

Two lint agents, not one. The private pass runs per user over `user-memory/`
and reports to them; the shared pass runs once over `shared-memory/`, where the
interesting defect is different — a note failing the table rule, i.e. private
business written where every member can read it. It names the note and the
category without repeating the content, since restating it spreads the very
thing being flagged. Both share `agents/common/memory-lint.md`.

Both are read-only, and that is enforced twice: the prompt says report-never-
repair, and `shared-memory/*` writes are already `@fs_write require`, so an
agent that tried to fix something would raise an approval card from an
unattended pass, which is auto-denied. Read-only is the only design that works
here, not merely the safe one.

One scheduler for cadences three orders of magnitude apart. TIC runs every few
minutes, a lint weekly — the case that tempts a second loop. It stays one
because the wake-up decides nothing: `base_tick` picks only how often to look,
and whether an agent runs for a user is `is_due` against persisted state.

Due-ness moves out of the run log into a new owner table, `system_agent_state`.
The two answer different questions: the run log skips idle ticks so it stays a
history rather than a heartbeat, while scheduling needs every attempt. Reading
due-ness off the log would re-run an idle agent on every tick and never bring a
weekly one due once its last productive run aged out. Persisting it is also
what makes a long interval survive a restart — an in-memory deadline is fine at
TIC's scale, but a weekly agent on a box rebooted every few days would have it
re-armed before it ever fired.

The shared store belongs to nobody, so `AgentScope::Instance` runs that pass as
the first unlocked admin. An ownerless run would write its trace into system.db,
which the runs endpoint shows to nobody by design, and its notify() would have
no recipient; attributing it to a user keeps the whole per-user surface working
unchanged.

Settings move to where the run log is. `ConfigSet` gains `owner`, so placement
is data on the set rather than a page that knows set names; the System agents
page grows one tab per agent holding its description, its settings (admin only)
and its runs — "why did this do nothing last night?" is half a schedule
question and half a log question. The form is shared with the Config page, and
writes still go through PUT /api/config/{key}.

Fixes an authorization gap found on the way: neither /api/config handler took
the caller into account, so any authenticated session could read and write
instance-wide config. The sidebar hiding the page is presentation, not access
control. Both are now admin-gated.
2026-07-28 21:24:16 +01:00
dguiducci 4b1affa600 plugins: merge the user Plugins page into per-plugin sidebar pages
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m1s
The generic per-user #plugins page is gone: a plugin with per-user
settings hosts them in its own web_pages() sidebar page instead
(Telegram's pairing page is new; Honcho's opt-in page already existed).
The admin catalog moves from #plugin-catalog to #plugins (old hash
redirected), and user_config_schema is removed from the Plugin trait,
the API DTOs and both plugins — the my-config endpoint, the
plugin_user_configs store and the update_user_config hook stay, now
driven by each plugin's own page fragment.
2026-07-28 20:48:03 +01:00
dguiducci 50e1333d99 mobile-connector: merge pairing+devices into one self-service Mobile App page
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 7m3s
The two admin-only console pages become a single "Mobile App" page
visible to every logged-in user: connection status (with the last
connection error for troubleshooting), the device list (admin sees all,
others only their own), a pairing dialog with the QR, and — admin-only —
a settings dialog hosting the plugin config, including a relay picker
(official grayed out, test, custom URL). The generic plugin-detail
config form defers to it via the new Plugin::config_in_detail_page flag.

Pairing is now self-service: any user opens a window and the device
auto-binds to them; revocation is admin-for-anyone, owner-for-self;
(re)binding to another user stays admin-only. Binding-managed plugins
(manages_own_access) now expose their non-admin pages to all users and
self-scope per caller (web_pages_for). The relay client records the
error that ends a WS session and clears it on reconnect.
2026-07-27 23:49:50 +01:00
dguiducci 165af19774 tic: run per-user under a system-agent scheduler, with a run log
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 6m58s
Reframe TIC from an ownerless global loop into a per-user system agent.
The events it reads live in each user's own encrypted mcp_events, the
connectors that produced them run in that user's container, and the
notifications go to that user's hub — so the previous design (built
against the ownerless Conversation bundle, writing into system.db and
notifying a hub with no subscribers) was inert by construction.

Core changes
- TicManager owns no timer and no user list. It now exposes
  run_for(user_id, pool, sessions, hub): one tick for one user, over
  deps unpacked from that user's UserContext. Removed from the
  Conversation bundle; Skald::tic_manager() is gone.
- New spawn_system_agents in wiring.rs: one instance-wide loop, spawned
  post-construction with a Weak<Skald> (like spawn_user_lifecycle).
  Each pass walks the directory and runs TIC for one user at a time —
  sequential, because a pass is N container round-trips and N LLM calls
  nobody is waiting on. A ConfigKeyUpdated on the interval key cuts the
  current wait short; enabled is re-read per pass.
- A user whose database is still locked is skipped (normal, not an
  error): the pool is the unlock token, so a user who hasn't logged in
  since restart has no readable events and nowhere to record a skip.
- The configured tic.security_group is re-checked per user through
  run_context::reconcile_group_for_user — a restricted member never
  gets a tool set their role wouldn't grant; unconfigured starts from
  role_default_run_context, never None (None = catch-all = wider).
- New system_agent_runs owner table (no user_id column — the file is
  the owner): start/finish split so a crash leaves a visible 'running'
  row, swept to 'failed' by the next start; safe because the scheduler
  is sequential and single-instance. An idle tick writes nothing.
- counting_notify wraps the notify tool so the run log can report
  notifications emitted without the tool knowing it's counted.
- The session's event channel is drained by a spawned task instead of
  a dropped receiver — the translator awaits its sends and would wedge
  at capacity.

EventLog::{Persist,Discard} on McpManager::new
- mcp_events is an owner table and its only reader (TIC) is per-user,
  so an event is something that happened to someone. The per-user
  runtime gets Persist; the ownerless global runtime gets Discard (its
  pool is system.db, rows would be unattributable and unread).

API + UI
- GET /api/system-agents/runs: the caller's own run history, scoped
  through require_context with no admin override (same promise as the
  rest of the private pool).
- web/components/system-agents.js replaces tic-sessions.js. The old
  #tic debug page inferred runs from leftover ephemeral sessions; the
  new #system-agents page (sidebar group 'extensions', visible to
  everyone — the data is the caller's own) reads the real run log.
- i18n: tic.* keys replaced with system_agents.* in en/it/fr.

Docs
- New docs/system-agents.md (user-facing: what TIC does, why it runs
  per person, why a run can be missing). Updated docs/settings.md and
  docs/index.md.
- agents/tic/AGENT.md reframed per-user: events are that person's,
  memory is user-memory/ (private) — never shared-memory/.
- CLAUDE.md records the system-agents design and the EventLog seam.
2026-07-27 11:39:13 +01:00
dguiducci a3e1b0add0 memory: reshape the two stores into a maintained wiki
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 6m50s
Memory was a scrapbook: notes accumulated, nothing kept them consistent,
and shared memory had no rule saying what belonged in it. This adopts the
LLM-wiki pattern — the assistant maintains an evolving artifact rather
than re-deriving knowledge each session.

The schema (agents/common/memory-wiki.md, included by the three type:chat
agents) adds an append-only log.md beside each index.md, names Ingest /
Recall / Lint as habits, and states the rule for shared memory: write it
there only if you would say it out loud with every member in the room.
One person's health, results or another member's opinion of them stays
private — that is what shared folders, not shared memory, are for.

Tampering is the reason the rules are shaped this way. Shared facts carry
provenance and are superseded rather than erased, and a member who
contradicts a fact they did not write gets a logged CLAIM instead of an
overwrite: only the originator or an admin can turn it into a change.
The approval gate cannot enforce this — it asks the caller, who is the
same person pushing — so a per-role write permission on shared memory is
still the real boundary. The prompt is the etiquette, not the fence.

append_file is a new fs tool because the log needs a write that cannot
shorten a file. On memory paths it is one SQL statement, so concurrent
appends (parallel tool batches, two sessions of one user) cannot lose a
line — a dropped line in an audit trail is worse than a failed write. It
is auto-allowed on shared-memory/log.md at a lower priority than the
shared write rule: gating the trail would be friction with no safety, and
a rejected log write yields an unlogged change.

memory::scaffold seeds index.md / log.md / user.md so the schema does not
describe files that do not exist. Seeded empty rather than left absent:
a missing note resolves to nothing at injection, so the model cannot tell
"nothing recorded yet" from "this mechanism is not running".

__MEMBERS__ renders the roster from users + roles instead of a note the
model maintains. A remembered copy drifts and can be talked into being
edited; this one bypasses the model entirely. users.notes are excluded —
they are the admin's private notes about a person and this block is
visible to every member.

Still open: a UI to browse memory (list_dir does not classify memory
paths yet), a tool-written revisions table (log lines are still typed by
the model), and the periodic lint pass.
2026-07-26 19:03:49 +01:00
dguiducci 5081ec2afe llm: drop model/agent scope matching; add instance-wide compaction model picker
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 6m50s
Remove the scope system end-to-end (llm_models.scope column, agent meta
scope field, scope-based tier in model selection, UI checkboxes/pills):
it was only a soft ranking hint, had drifted (6 UI scopes vs 3 used by
agents, 'general' not even selectable) and duplicated what strength
already decides. Strength stays the single AUTO-selection axis.

Compaction: the summary model is now pickable from the Settings page
via a new PropertyType::LlmModel config property (registry key
compaction_model), instance-wide and live (no restart). Fallback chain:
explicit pick -> compaction.strength from config.yml -> priority order;
a deleted configured model degrades to AUTO. ContextCompactor reads the
key at compact time through GlobalConfigManager.
2026-07-25 10:48:09 +01:00
dguiducci 3c52587dee file viewer: edit Markdown with optimistic-lock conflict detection
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 6m47s
- GET /api/file returns ETag (mtime+size) + X-Writable on disk files;
  PUT /api/file accepts optional if_match -> 409 Conflict on stale version
  (last-write-wins preserved when omitted), echoes the new ETag
- FileViewerBase: View | Edit tabs for .md when the caller can write;
  source textarea with Save/Cancel, live preview while editing
- Watcher no longer clobbers the buffer mid-edit: while editing with
  unsaved changes it probes the server ETag and only raises a conflict
  when the remote actually moved on (own-save echo is ignored)
- Conflict banner: Reload remote | Copy mine, then reload | Overwrite
- i18n (en/it/fr) + CSS; docs/projects.md updated
2026-07-23 22:03:43 +01:00
dguiducci e70c4a90f3 file viewer, docs, ws: add image/media preview path, projects doc, ws wiring
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 6m44s
Show file gains image and video display for capable agents. Docs add
projects.md and update index. Wire ws file-watch in project-board.
Minor fs tool and CLAUDE.md updates.
2026-07-22 18:52:03 +01:00
dguiducci 9224245f6f docs overhaul: agent-facing doc bundle, read-only docs mount in containers
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 6m38s
- Strip ~55 stale upstream docs (dev docs never meant for the agents)
- Write new slim index.md as an agent-facing guide to the app's features
- Add new plugin docs: comfyui, elevenlabs, kokoro_tts, orpheus_tts_3b,
  remote_connectivity, whisper_local (replacing old names)
- Add docs_host to UserFs: docs/… and ~/docs/… resolve to {WD}/docs,
  mounted read-only at /root/docs in every user's container
- Instruct assistant/kid/project-coordinator agents to read docs/index.md
  when users ask how the software works
2026-07-22 10:20:21 +01:00
dguiducci fb3eeeeec6 Refactor: remove desktop/Tauri bundle, add i18n, CI/CD pipeline
Nightly Build / build (push) Failing after 6s
- Remove desktop (Tauri) bundle: docs/desktop.md, icons/, tauri.conf.json,
  src/desktop/mod.rs, gen/schemas/
- Remove build.rs (no longer needed)
- Add i18n system (crates/core-api, plugin-mobile-connector, web)
- Refactor config system (src/config.rs, boot_format.rs)
- Add mobile connector features (app, router, device pairing)
- Plugin system improvements (skald-core)
- Update dependencies (Cargo.lock, Cargo.toml)
- CI/CD: Gitea Actions workflows (nightly + release), package.sh,
  verify-version.sh, builds.skaldagent.net config
2026-07-19 22:35:06 +01:00
dguiducci 38494a85a9 First Version 2026-07-10 15:02:09 +01:00