c1a8227e119c41104eef364f217b6cdd44392f07
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Daniele
|
0042f3dbcb |
fix(image-generate): save generated images into the caller's workspace
Nightly Build / build (push) Successful in 5m42s
image_generate wrote the file into the server's own data/images/ and handed
that host path to the model. It is a path in nobody's vocabulary: not the
caller's home, not their container. Telegram's send_attachment therefore
resolved it under the user's home and answered "file not found", and
read_file, execute_cmd and the viewer could not reach it either. The web URL
was the only surface that worked, which is why the failure only ever showed
on Telegram -- and why the model there, having no working way to hand the
file over, started inventing send_photo and send_media.
Placement moves to the tool, the one place holding a ToolContext:
- The manager returns bytes (generate_bytes) and no longer knows where an
image goes. It has no UserFs and no session, so it never could have.
- run_with saves through uploads::save_to_home into uploads/{session}/. The
returned path is agent vocabulary, so every consumer resolves it, and that
is the one directory the media inliner is authorized to read from -- a
vision model can be shown the image it just made. execute_async, the
context-free path, now fails loudly rather than writing somewhere nobody
can read; same shape as execute_cmd.
- The extension is sniffed rather than assumed png: it is what decides
whether Telegram sends the picture inline or as an anonymous document, and
providers return jpeg and webp too. The file is named after the prompt, so
it reads as something in the explorer and in Telegram.
The result still carries a url, since the chat renders Markdown images and
 beats naming a file the user then has to open. It points at
/api/file?path=..., which resolves through the caller's own UserFs. The old
/api/images/{id} route is removed: it had no writer left once placement
moved, and it addressed one instance-wide directory behind require_auth
alone, with no notion of who owned the image -- the same shape as the /data
static mount removed before it. That leaves data_root unused, so the manager
no longer knows about the server's filesystem at all.
Docs: the Telegram page explains send_attachment as the channel's equivalent
of show_file_to_user; the ComfyUI page says where a generated image lands and
which of the two handles to use where.
Also introduces CHANGELOG.md and the standing rule for it in CLAUDE.md.
|
||
 dguiducci
|
178a38357e |
feat(users): UserManager with per-user SQLCipher, and extract skald-core crate
Two changes developed together in one session; they share the same module
structure (db/mod.rs, the core lib root) and only compile together, so they
land as one commit.
## UserManager + per-user encryption (§9/§11)
New `users::UserManager`: owns the system.db pool plus a map
`userid -> SqlitePool` of unlocked databases. The pool *is* the unlock token —
its connect options carry the DEK as SQLCipher's raw key, so an open pool means
the key is in RAM until restart and dropping it re-locks (§9). Knows nothing
about cookies.
New `crypto` module: envelope encryption. A random 256-bit DEK encrypts
`{userid}.db`; `users.database_password` holds it sealed with AES-256-GCM under
`Argon2id(password, salt)`. The AEAD tag is the password verifier — one
derivation both authenticates and yields the key, so encrypted users store no
second hash. Cleartext users store the Argon2id output directly, compared in
constant time. Argon2 runs in spawn_blocking behind a 2-permit semaphore
(256 MiB per derivation).
- SQLCipher via `libsqlite3-sys` `bundled-sqlcipher-vendored-openssl`, pinned
<0.38 so it unifies with the one sqlx-sqlite links (a newer copy would apply
the feature to a SQLite sqlx never uses). OpenSSL is vendored and static, so
the binary stays self-contained.
- Schema split into `create_registry_tables` (instance-wide, no user key) and
`create_owner_tables` (one owner's content, identical in every file). No FK in
the owner bucket may reach the registry — enforced by a standalone test.
Dropped `chat_history.model_db_id` (write-only, and the only registry-crossing
key); moved `projects`/`project_tickets` into the owner bucket.
- Provisioning invariant: the file is written before the row, deleted after it,
so a crash leaves an orphan file, never a user without a database. `open_db`
never creates: a missing file is an error, not a silent empty database.
Not consumed yet: no login, call sites still use the shared system.db pool.
## Extract crates/skald-core
The headless core moves out of `src/` into its own crate; `skald` (server) and
the coming `skald-setup` are shells around it. Two dependencies on the shell
were inverted rather than dragged along, so the core names neither Tauri nor any
concrete plugin:
- `Plugin::tools(self: Arc<Self>)` — plugins contribute tools through this hook
(sibling of `http_router`), so the core no longer downcasts to
`MobileConnectorPlugin`.
- `tools::restart::set_restart_handler` — the desktop shell installs its
teardown-and-respawn; the core defaults to the supervisor exit code. The core
loses its `desktop` feature.
- `boot`'s stdout formatter moves to the binary (`src/boot_format.rs`); the core
only emits tracing events.
All 79 core tests pass; the binary boots and serves in a clean directory, and
the mobile-connector tools still register through the new hook.
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