The LLM-requests page has been empty since 24ee5b8: deleting
`session/handler/llm_call.rs` dropped both halves of the request log.
The kernel builds the `ModelRequest` itself and sets `log: None`, so the
`LoggingModel` decorator — wrapped once per model by `LlmManager` — wrote
every metadata row with a NULL `user_id`, while the page (and the detail
endpoint) filter on it. Nothing wrote `llm_request_payloads` at all any
more, so the payload viewer had nothing to show either.
Correlation cannot come from `LlmManager`: it builds one shared client
per model and does not know whose traffic it serves. It now comes from
the `ModelSelector`, the one component that knows both the model and the
owner: `SkaldSelector::with_log(RequestLogTarget)` wraps the model it
hands out, so metadata lands in `llm_requests` attributed to the user and
the payload lands in that user's own encrypted DB, keyed by `request_id`.
Session and frame are read off the request's `conversation`/`frame`,
which makes kernel rounds, sub-agent frames and compaction summaries all
attributed with no extra plumbing (`ModelRequest::log` stays unused).
The compactor's summariser call is attributed too, which it never was:
`try_compact`/`force_compact` now take the owner (its selector is built
per compaction, so it can carry the target).
Three tests in `llm::logging` lock this down — the owner/session/frame
columns, the error row with the provider's rejected body, and the
metadata-only path when no owner pool is available.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Memory was a scrapbook: notes accumulated, nothing kept them consistent,
and shared memory had no rule saying what belonged in it. This adopts the
LLM-wiki pattern — the assistant maintains an evolving artifact rather
than re-deriving knowledge each session.
The schema (agents/common/memory-wiki.md, included by the three type:chat
agents) adds an append-only log.md beside each index.md, names Ingest /
Recall / Lint as habits, and states the rule for shared memory: write it
there only if you would say it out loud with every member in the room.
One person's health, results or another member's opinion of them stays
private — that is what shared folders, not shared memory, are for.
Tampering is the reason the rules are shaped this way. Shared facts carry
provenance and are superseded rather than erased, and a member who
contradicts a fact they did not write gets a logged CLAIM instead of an
overwrite: only the originator or an admin can turn it into a change.
The approval gate cannot enforce this — it asks the caller, who is the
same person pushing — so a per-role write permission on shared memory is
still the real boundary. The prompt is the etiquette, not the fence.
append_file is a new fs tool because the log needs a write that cannot
shorten a file. On memory paths it is one SQL statement, so concurrent
appends (parallel tool batches, two sessions of one user) cannot lose a
line — a dropped line in an audit trail is worse than a failed write. It
is auto-allowed on shared-memory/log.md at a lower priority than the
shared write rule: gating the trail would be friction with no safety, and
a rejected log write yields an unlogged change.
memory::scaffold seeds index.md / log.md / user.md so the schema does not
describe files that do not exist. Seeded empty rather than left absent:
a missing note resolves to nothing at injection, so the model cannot tell
"nothing recorded yet" from "this mechanism is not running".
__MEMBERS__ renders the roster from users + roles instead of a note the
model maintains. A remembered copy drifts and can be talked into being
edited; this one bypasses the model entirely. users.notes are excluded —
they are the admin's private notes about a person and this block is
visible to every member.
Still open: a UI to browse memory (list_dir does not classify memory
paths yet), a tool-written revisions table (log lines are still typed by
the model), and the periodic lint pass.
The session handler is now a thin shell: three entry points in
kernel_turn.rs (run_kernel_turn / recover_turn / resolve_pending_call)
and the ChatSessionHandler. Everything that shaped a Value — projection,
recovery, compaction mechanics, the LLM loop, message building — lives
in agent-loop or behind a loop_adapters trait.
agent-loop:
- projection/ (mod + media): stored history -> wire messages, the one
place provider divergence lives; well-formedness contract, DTL
injections (append-only), media parts. LinearAssembler is now a
Projection + ProjectionHooks config, not its own implementation
- recovery.rs: reap interrupted batches -> resolve the deepest frame's
non-terminal calls (Running by policy + RestartHint, AwaitingHuman
re-asked) -> un-wedge finished children -> cascade up, every frame on
its own agent (B3)
- compaction.rs: split point (never assistant+tool group), transcript,
SUMMARY_PREFIX/preamble/template, the no-tools model call, summary row
- manager: resolve_pending (gate skipped, real ToolContext, then
continue incl. sub-agent); start_loop used by recovery; LiveInput
- delegate: AsyncExecutor + StoreSink for mode:async (durable cron row,
result delivered back into the parent conversation)
- kernel/context/store: support the above (TurnScope via Extensions,
frame lookups, aligned result-text semantics)
skald-core:
- loop_adapters: UserLoopRuntime (D12 - one LoopManager per user),
TurnScope (per-turn state in the Extensions type-map; no scope is
denied), projection_cfg/media_source/tool_digest (Skald's projection
knobs without owning projection code), async_task (CronExecutor +
DurableSink)
- session/handler: stripped to mod.rs + kernel_turn.rs + config.rs +
interface_tools.rs + media.rs; deleted agent_dispatch, approval,
dispatch, emitter, gate, llm_call, llm_loop, message_builder,
messages, outcome, resume
- compactor.rs: policy only (threshold, model pick, CompactionEvent);
mechanics are the crate's
CLAUDE.md updated (recovery, compaction, sub-agents, approval gate,
projection sections now describe the crate-owned flow).
The LLM call path now runs on the agent-loop crate's clients and trait:
- core-api: BuiltLlmClient.client is Arc<dyn agent_loop::model::Model>;
chatbot.rs (ChatbotClient + wire types) deleted; APP_NAME re-exported
from agent-loop
- providers (openai/anthropic/ollama/openrouter/requesty/declared) build
OpenAiModel/AnthropicModel/OllamaModel with the model's wire id
- LoggingModel decorator (llm/logging.rs) replaces LoggingChatbotClient;
per-request correlation (session/stack/user) travels in the new
ModelRequest.log field, never sent to providers
- llm_call/llm_loop/compactor speak Model::complete + ModelResponse;
retriability via Model::is_retriable (structured status, B6 rule now
the crate's default); payload persistence reads RawMeta off
ModelResponse/ModelError
- crates/llm-client and skald-core/src/chatbot deleted
Full workspace test suite green (incl. 162 skald-core + 32 agent-loop).
Remove the scope system end-to-end (llm_models.scope column, agent meta
scope field, scope-based tier in model selection, UI checkboxes/pills):
it was only a soft ranking hint, had drifted (6 UI scopes vs 3 used by
agents, 'general' not even selectable) and duplicated what strength
already decides. Strength stays the single AUTO-selection axis.
Compaction: the summary model is now pickable from the Settings page
via a new PropertyType::LlmModel config property (registry key
compaction_model), instance-wide and live (no restart). Fallback chain:
explicit pick -> compaction.strength from config.yml -> priority order;
a deleted configured model degrades to AUTO. ContextCompactor reads the
key at compact time through GlobalConfigManager.
Replace the old session_mcp_grants/stack_mcp_grants table pair with
a single activated_tools table that anchors each activation at the
assistant message_id that triggered it. The durable write moves from
the activate_tools tool itself to the round loop (handle_tool_call),
which has the message_id the DTL serializer positions injected tool
blocks against.
Introduce DtlMode (None / AnthropicToolReference / KimiSystemTools),
resolved per model from capabilities (opt-in via tool_search)
combined with the provider's dtl_format(). The message builder inserts
Kimi system {tools} blocks at the activation position, or emits
Anthropic tool_reference markers on the tool result. The tool-def
surface (all_tool_defs) switches shape: Anthropic declares everything
deferred; Kimi omits activated tools from the top-level array (system
takes over); None keeps the old grant-set logic.
Anthropic client: accept structured system arrays (cache_control on
the static block when DTL is active), carry defer_loading through
conversion, emit tool_reference blocks on result messages. Prompt
caching enabled exactly when DTL is active (anthropic provider).
MCP server list in the prompt is now a static catalogue (not split
Available/Active) — the split invalidated the cache on every activation.
Groundwork for providers.yaml dtl: key; Moonshot/Kimi providers wired
with kimi_system_tools and the k3* enrich now adds tool_search.
Compactor re-anchors activations whose message was compacted away.
After a reinstall the catalog entry carries new llm_short_description,
icon and code. Previously the running servers (global + per-user) kept
their old metadata and code until the next login.
- Add refresh_connector_after_reinstall on Skald: re-snapshots the
description from the catalog, reconciles local files on per-user
connectors, and restarts both the global and per-user servers
- Add set_description db accessor for mcp_global_servers
- user_row_spec_resolved now injects the live catalog description
(over the bare name) so user-runtime connectors show the right blurb
- marketplace install() fetches a fresh feed instead of the browse
cache, so a reinstall reflects the changed manifest immediately
- memory_docs list_with_metadata: use SQL substr to detect trailing
newline instead of counting newlines and adding 1 unconditionally
- list_files: remove meta_smoke tests that referenced a non-existent
scratchpad directory
- list_files: new with_metadata parameter returns {path, line_count?, size}
per entry (both disk and memory-docs) so the agent can spot large files
worth outlining before reading
- ast_outline: replaced flat tree-sitter JSON walker with a recursive one
that shows nested keys at every depth, with inline scalar values and
container summaries
- message_builder: format active MCP connectors as a table with description
instead of a bare bullet list
- read_file description now hints to use get_ast_outline first
- tools.md: agent guidance to outline before reading
When the resolved model declares an input modality (vision → images,
video, document → PDFs), read_file now hands a binary media file back to
the model as native input instead of failing on non-UTF-8 bytes.
- ToolResult gains a Media { text, media } variant carrying MediaRef
{ host_path, mime }; the tool message keeps only the text note, the
bytes travel out of band in a new additive chat_llm_tools.media column
(mirrors preview_old/new).
- read_file sniffs the resolved host file; a recognized medium becomes a
Media result (with a neutral note), everything else keeps the textual
path. Capability gating lives in the message builder, so read_file
never needs the model caps and degrades cleanly on a text-only model.
- MessageBuilder inlines current-turn tool media as a synthetic user
message right after the tool-result group (media_turn_start boundary,
so older turns are never re-billed), reusing media.rs primitives via a
new inline_paths helper that contains against the caller's workspace
roots. OpenAI forwards the parts verbatim; the Anthropic client now
also translates the PDF `file` part into a native `document` block
(image_url → image was already handled).
- read_file's description is annotated per serving model in
call_llm_round, listing the formats it can open, so the model knows
reading one shows it the content.
Tests: media sniff (PDF), PDF file-part build, inline_paths containment
+ capability gating, capability hint, read_file media-vs-text, Anthropic
file→document, and the owner-schema-stands-alone check with the new
column.
Rework projects from single-user leftovers into shareable endeavours.
- DB: move `projects` from the owner bucket to the registry (system.db,
not encrypted); add `owner_user_id` + `slug` (drop free `path`); new
`project_members(project_id, user_id, can_write)` mirroring
`shared_folder_members`. Drop `project_tickets` entirely. Only user↔agent
conversations stay encrypted (per-user DB) — each member keeps a private
project chat. Registry home dissolves the cross-DB-FK problem.
- Filesystem/container: on disk `{WD}/projects/{owner_userid}/{slug}`,
agent/container path `projects/{owner_username}/{slug}`. Two-segment routing
in UserFs (ProjectMount + host_base_and_tail arm) and a second loop in
build_user_fs; read-only members get a :ro mount. Reuse the shared-folder
remount machinery (refresh_user_shared_folders -> refresh_user_mounts).
- Remove the ticket system: ProjectTicketManager, UserContext.tickets, its
wiring, and the project_tickets references in scheduled_jobs/cron.
- API: repoint handlers to the registry pool + membership scoping. Sharing is
self-service — owner or any write-member may add/remove members and set
read/write; only the owner deletes; the owner cannot be removed. New
POST/DELETE /api/projects/{id}/members[/{user_id}]. Seed `@fs_any allow
projects/*`; build_runtime_run_context sets working_directory to the agent
path and drops the host-path allow_fs_writes.
- Frontend: create form without the free path field, owner/read-write badges;
the detail page becomes header + description + sharing panel + Open chat + a
file-explorer placeholder (the future primary surface). i18n en/it/fr.
Re-architects MCP from one owner table + agent-written registration into an
admin-curated catalog with two runtimes unioned per session, surfaced in the UI
as "Connectors" (mcp/schema stays neutral, §0.1).
Two runtimes behind one seam (§7):
- Global runtime: shared, stateless connectors (web-search, Tavily…) on the
HOST, connected at boot from mcp_global_servers, access-filtered per user via
mcp_global_access.
- Per-user runtime: a user's activated connectors run INSIDE their container,
started at first login from mcp_user_servers and living until restart (§9);
docker exec -i children die via kill_on_drop when the UserContext drops.
- McpProvider trait (mcp/provider.rs): the session round-loop never learns which
runtime owns a server. McpManager implements it directly (inert ownerless
bundle); UserMcpView implements global ∪ user with an accessible_global
snapshot. Both share McpManager::connect_all; McpServerSpec +
global_row_spec/user_row_spec turn a DB row into a connectable spec.
- mcp-client: McpServerConfig.launch_in runs a stdio command inside a container
via docker exec -i (set at runtime, never parsed from config).
Authorization is a capability on the role, not `if role==admin` (§0.1/§14):
role_capabilities table + db/role_capabilities.rs — register_remote and
register_local_from_catalog are self-service (seeded on every new role), while
register_local_script and manage_catalog are admin-only. admin holds every
capability by construction. This removes the agent-facing register_mcp/delete_mcp
tools and the mcp kinds of list_items/toggle_item, closing the §14 RCE vector.
Schema:
- Registry: mcp_catalog (vetted templates — schema only, no live creds),
mcp_global_servers + mcp_global_access, role_capabilities.
- Owner: mcp_user_servers (per-user activations; api_key encrypted at rest,
catalog_name a bare TEXT snapshot, never an owner→registry FK).
- Drops the old owner table mcp_servers.
API + UI: src/frontend/api/mcp.rs (admin catalog/global/access + user
available/activate/activated, all capability-gated via require_cap);
web/components/connectors.js (<connectors-page>) renders the user view always
and the admin view for role_id === 'admin'.
Deferred: interactive per-user auth (OAuth callback / QR / SSH elicitation, §15)
— only none/api_key wired; no boot seed of catalog presets; per-(user, session)
MCP grant model still open.
Realizes blueprint §6: each user gets a permanent Docker container
(skald-{userid}, our own skald-runtime image with python+node) as their
execution sandbox. Docker is now a hard requirement — a missing daemon fails
Skald::new and the process exits at boot.
- ContainerManager (crates/skald-core/src/container/): docker availability
check, builds skald-runtime from the embedded Dockerfile, reconciles one
running container per active user at boot, stops them at shutdown, and
ensure/remove on user create/delete. Shells the docker CLI (no client crate).
- UserFs (core-api): pure value type carried in ToolContext, mapping the agent's
single namespace — ~/ → homes/{userid}, shared/{X}/ → shared/{X} (membership),
user-memory/ + shared-memory/ → SQLite — to host and container paths.
- execute_cmd now runs inside the caller's container via `docker exec`.
- fs-tools resolve every physical path through UserFs to the per-user host
workspace, host-side, with fail-closed symlink/`..` containment
(resolve_host_path: canonicalize + prefix-check). grep_files resolves its root
the same way but stays disk-only.
- shared_folders + shared_folder_members (registry, junction table with
can_write) back the shared-folder membership that drives both the container
mounts and the shared/{X} routing.
- Threading: UserContext.fs → ChatSessionManager → handler → ToolContext.fs.
Per-user MCP servers do not yet run in the container (next round).
Add a virtual memory namespace backed by SQLite, surfaced through the
fs-tools, with private (per-user) and shared (system) stores.
Storage
- `memory_docs` owner table + external-content FTS5 index with sync triggers.
- `db/memory_docs.rs` accessor: get / upsert / list / search (bm25+snippet) / delete.
Routing (tools/fs)
- `classify_memory` splits paths on the raw first component; `..` clamps inside
the store, never escaping to disk.
- read/write/list/edit/insert/replace/search_file route `user-memory/` to the
owner pool and `shared-memory/` to the system pool (a singleton captured in
`register_all`); every other path stays on disk. Each tool extracts a pure
transform shared between its disk and memory paths.
- New `memory_search` tool over the FTS index (scope private/shared/all),
with a sanitised FTS5 query. grep_files stays disk-only.
Approval
- `user-memory/*` allow (read+write); `shared-memory/*` reads allow,
writes require approval so the agent can't silently push one person's data
into shared memory. `memory_search` allowed via a path-less rule.
- migrate away the old `memory/*` and blanket `shared-memory/*` rows.
Prompt injection
- `MessageBuilder::load_inject_memory` reads `user-memory/` (owner pool) and
`shared-memory/` (system pool) inject entries from SQLite; disk paths
unchanged. The system pool is threaded ChatSessionManager -> handler ->
MessageBuilder.
- main and project-coordinator inject `user-memory/index.md` +
`shared-memory/index.md`; common/memory.md rewritten for the two stores.
- New skald-setup crate: interactive first-run wizard that creates the
admin user, prompts for encryption choice and password
- Auth system: session-based login/logout with cookie, guard middleware
- Roles API: CRUD for data-driven roles, seeded on first boot
- Users management API: create, list, edit, delete users
- Setup state API: check if first admin has been created
- Frontend: login-page, setup-page, users-page, roles-page, profile-page
components with corresponding CSS
- Topbar: avatar dropdown with profile link and logout
- Sidebar: nav entries for Users and Roles (admin only)
- Page shell CSS: layout support for the new pages
- build.sh: builds both skald and skald-setup binaries
- run.sh: runs skald-setup before the server loop
- CLAUDE.md: updated workspace layout and build/run docs
Two changes developed together in one session; they share the same module
structure (db/mod.rs, the core lib root) and only compile together, so they
land as one commit.
## UserManager + per-user encryption (§9/§11)
New `users::UserManager`: owns the system.db pool plus a map
`userid -> SqlitePool` of unlocked databases. The pool *is* the unlock token —
its connect options carry the DEK as SQLCipher's raw key, so an open pool means
the key is in RAM until restart and dropping it re-locks (§9). Knows nothing
about cookies.
New `crypto` module: envelope encryption. A random 256-bit DEK encrypts
`{userid}.db`; `users.database_password` holds it sealed with AES-256-GCM under
`Argon2id(password, salt)`. The AEAD tag is the password verifier — one
derivation both authenticates and yields the key, so encrypted users store no
second hash. Cleartext users store the Argon2id output directly, compared in
constant time. Argon2 runs in spawn_blocking behind a 2-permit semaphore
(256 MiB per derivation).
- SQLCipher via `libsqlite3-sys` `bundled-sqlcipher-vendored-openssl`, pinned
<0.38 so it unifies with the one sqlx-sqlite links (a newer copy would apply
the feature to a SQLite sqlx never uses). OpenSSL is vendored and static, so
the binary stays self-contained.
- Schema split into `create_registry_tables` (instance-wide, no user key) and
`create_owner_tables` (one owner's content, identical in every file). No FK in
the owner bucket may reach the registry — enforced by a standalone test.
Dropped `chat_history.model_db_id` (write-only, and the only registry-crossing
key); moved `projects`/`project_tickets` into the owner bucket.
- Provisioning invariant: the file is written before the row, deleted after it,
so a crash leaves an orphan file, never a user without a database. `open_db`
never creates: a missing file is an error, not a silent empty database.
Not consumed yet: no login, call sites still use the shared system.db pool.
## Extract crates/skald-core
The headless core moves out of `src/` into its own crate; `skald` (server) and
the coming `skald-setup` are shells around it. Two dependencies on the shell
were inverted rather than dragged along, so the core names neither Tauri nor any
concrete plugin:
- `Plugin::tools(self: Arc<Self>)` — plugins contribute tools through this hook
(sibling of `http_router`), so the core no longer downcasts to
`MobileConnectorPlugin`.
- `tools::restart::set_restart_handler` — the desktop shell installs its
teardown-and-respawn; the core defaults to the supervisor exit code. The core
loses its `desktop` feature.
- `boot`'s stdout formatter moves to the binary (`src/boot_format.rs`); the core
only emits tracing events.
All 79 core tests pass; the binary boots and serves in a clean directory, and
the mobile-connector tools still register through the new hook.
dguiducciandClaude Opus 5